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Abstract 
 
Global energy demand is increasing, with the adoption of electric vehicles, in 
particular, representing a significant prospective demand on electricity distribution 
networks. The exploitation of renewable generation sources, driven by increased 
economic viability, technological maturity, and the need for environmental 
sustainability, is expected to play an increasingly important role in meeting this 
demand. However, the adoption of such low-carbon technologies necessitates a 
significant change in the way that distribution networks are monitored and controlled. 
This work examines the state of the art in the impact of low-carbon technologies on 
distribution networks, the technical strategies available to mitigate these impacts and 
their relative merits, and the architecture of the control systems used to effect such 
strategies. Smart metering and advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) are a 
fundamental component of these smart grid systems, providing widespread visibility of 
conditions at the very periphery of distribution networks which has not previously been 
feasible, but where the impact of low-carbon technologies is significant. This work 
describes the development of a hardware-in-the-loop test rig incorporating multiple, 
custom-built, hardware smart meter test beds, and the use of this test rig to 
demonstrate the implementation of real-time voltage control within a simulated low 
voltage (LV) distribution network. However, the adoption of smart metering and AMI 
inevitably incurs cyber security vulnerabilities which did not exist in the case of meters 
with no facility for remote communication. This work examines cyber security issues 
pertinent to smart grids and AMI in particular, and describes the analysis of the cyber 
security vulnerabilities of a commercially deployed smart electricity meter. The 
exploitation of these vulnerabilities in a manner which permits unauthorised electronic 
access to the device is also described. Finally, recommendations are made of revisions 
to the hardware, firmware and communications protocols used by the compromised 
meter which may mitigate the vulnerabilities identified. 
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1 - Introduction 
 
1.1 - Background 
 
Worldwide, electricity systems are undergoing rapid change. As energy demand 
increases, renewable generation sources are becoming widely adopted. Smart meters 
are a fundamental element of the smart grids needed to accommodate such 
developments, and are the subject of this research. 
 
1.1.1 - Energy demand and renewable generation 
 
Global energy consumption in 2050 is predicted to be more than 50 % greater than in 
2018. More than half of this increase is expected to be driven by economic 
development and growing populations in non-OECD countries, such as India and China 
[1]. This is shown in Figure 1.1 [1]. 
 
 
Figure 1.1: World energy consumption [1] 
 
Renewable energy is predicted to be the fastest-growing electricity generation source, 
with increased economic viability, technological maturity, and the need for 
environmental sustainability expected to result in renewable sources contributing 
almost 50 % of world electricity generation in 2050. Of these renewable sources, the 
greatest increase is predicted to be in wind and solar generation [1]. This is shown in 
Figure 1.2 [1]. 
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The European Union (EU) has committed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to 80–
95 % below the levels in 1990, by 2050. In order to achieve this, a greater proportion 
of electricity in total energy consumption is proposed, up to 39 % by 2050, of which up 
to 97 % is to be generated by renewable sources [2]. 
 
 
Figure 1.2: Global electricity generation [1] 
 
More immediately, the 2009 Renewable Energy Directive [3], a component of the EU’s 
2020 climate & energy package, requires member countries to increase the proportion 
of renewable energy in their national consumption, with an overall European target of 
20 % by 2020. This represents more than double the 2010 proportion of 9.8 %. 
 
Under the Renewable Energy Directive [3], targets for renewable production were based 
on member countries’ current capacity, and anticipated scope for growth. In the case 
of the UK, the target is 15 %. In response to this, the Government’s 2010 National 
Renewable Energy Action Plan for the United Kingdom [4] proposed a target of 30 % 
renewable electricity generation by 2020. In 2019, renewables constituted 36.9 % of 
total UK electricity generation, with an installed capacity of 47.4 GW at the end of 2019 
[5]. This is shown in Figure 1.3 [6]. 
 
At the end of May 2020, solar photovoltaic (PV) generation capacity in the UK was 
approximately 13 436 MW across 1 036 077 installations, or 28 % of total renewable 
generation capacity. Small-scale installations of up to 4 kW represent approximately 
20 % of solar PV generation capacity in the UK [7], encouraged by feed-in tariffs 
introduced under the Energy Act 2008 [8], and available from 2010. 
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Figure 1.3: UK electricity generation by fuel type [6] 
 
1.1.2 - Electric vehicles 
 
The global electric car stock, including both purely electric, battery electric vehicles 
(BEVs), and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs), reached 7.2 million vehicles in 
2019. The stock of electric buses also increased to approximately 500 000 vehicles, 
and the stock of two-wheeled electric vehicles reached 350 million. By 2030, the global 
stock of electric cars and commercial vehicles is predicted to be as high as 245 million 
[9]. The evolution of the global electric car stock from 2013 to 2017, and now 
dominated by China, is shown in Figure 1.4 [9]. 
 
 
Figure 1.4: Evolution of the global electric car stock, 2013–2017 [9] 
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A mandate of the EU’s 2009 Renewable Energy Directive [3] was that at least 10 % of 
energy used for transportation in member countries should be from renewable sources 
by 2020. In the UK, plug-in car grants, introduced in 2011 and facilitated by the Energy 
Act 2008 [8], have contributed to a total of over 244 000 licensed plug-in electric cars 
on the road, as of the end of December 2019 [10]. The Society of Motor Manufacturers 
and Traders expects plug-in vehicles to constitute approximately 10 % of new car 
registrations in 2020 [11] 
 
Electric vehicle charging, ranging from connections to domestic outlets to commercial 
charging stations, represents a significant prospective demand on distribution 
networks. For example, the Supercharger charger, manufactured by Tesla, is capable of 
charging a single vehicle at 120 kW, with 16 585 such chargers installed worldwide as 
of the end of May 2020 [12]. 
 
1.1.3 - Smart grids 
 
The adoption of low-carbon technologies, such as renewable generation, energy 
storage, and electric vehicles, imposes a significant change in the demands on 
electricity distribution networks, and necessitates a change in the way that they are 
monitored and controlled. The adoption of renewable energy sources, in particular, is 
leading to a departure from the historical approach of centralised generation by a 
comparatively small number of large-scale, typically thermal plants. Instead, generation 
is increasingly decentralised and geographically distributed, existing at the very 
periphery of distribution networks in the case of, for example, domestic solar PV 
installations. A smart grid may be broadly defined as one which accommodates such 
low-carbon technologies, with monitoring and control achieved by means of additional 
technology installed on distribution networks, and associated telecommunications 
infrastructure [13], [14]. An overview of the topology and components typical of 
prospective smart grids is illustrated in Figure 1.5 [15]. 
 
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 [16] provided $4.5 billion of 
funding for power system modernisation, including smart grid development. China's 
State Grid Corporation presented plans for a pilot smart grid programme in 2010, with 
$96 billion expected to have been invested by 2020 [17]. 
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Figure 1.5: Smart grid topology and components [15] 
 
In Europe, at least 950 projects have been, or are being, undertaken, across the 28 EU 
member countries plus Norway and Switzerland, totalling approximately €5 billion of 
investment [18]. The distribution of smart grid research and development (R&D) and 
deployment projects in Europe is shown in Figure 1.6 [18]. 
 
In the UK, the Low Carbon Networks Fund (LCNF) provided approximately £250 million 
of funding to 65 projects between 2010 and 2015. This was intended to stimulate the 
development and trial of the low-carbon technologies and infrastructure constituting 
smart grids, and to promote energy saving schemes. Examples of the projects 
undertaken include trials of energy storage, analysis based on the enhanced visibility 
provided by electrical measurement devices located at points on distribution networks 
which were not previously monitored, and measures to provide the additional network 
automation and control which may be required in the presence of high penetrations of 
distributed generation [19]. 
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Figure 1.6: Smart grid R&D and demonstration projects in Europe [18] 
 
1.1.4 - Smart electricity meters 
 
In their most basic form, smart meters are distinguished from conventional utility 
meters by the facility to electronically communicate the values they measure and 
record to utilities, for the purpose of billing. This negates the requirement for manual 
meter reading, and provides the facility for more granular recording of energy 
consumption. Meters which fulfil this requirement are typically referred to as 
components of an automatic meter reading (AMR) infrastructure. More advanced smart 
electricity meters, capable of high-speed, two-way communication with utilities and 
other head-end systems, offer the facility of readings taken on demand, as well as the 
potential for demand-side management (DSM), for example by means of real-time 
pricing, or electrical measurements taken for the purpose of distribution network 
monitoring. Such meters are typically referred to as components of an advanced 
metering infrastructure (AMI) [13], [20]. The evolution of smart meter technology is 
shown in Figure 1.7 [21]. 
  1 - Introduction 
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Figure 1.7: Smart meter technology evolution [21] 
 
The fundamental elements of a smart meter, from acquisition of measurements of the 
electrical network to which it is connected, to communication with the utility or head-
end system via a wide area network (WAN), are illustrated in Figure 1.8 [13]. 
 
 
Figure 1.8: Functional block diagram of a smart meter [13] 
 
AMI is considered to be a foundation investment in smart grids by enabling control at 
customer level, for example in the case of DSM, as well as by providing real-time 
visibility for the purpose of distribution network control and automation [20], [22]. 
This is shown in Figure 1.9 [20] 
 
Globally, smart meter penetration is expected to reach approximately 53 % by the end 
of 2025 [23]. In Europe, legislation [24] under the EU’s Third Energy Package mandates 
that, subject to a positive long-term cost-benefit analysis, member countries should 
equip 80 % of consumers with smart electricity meters by 2020. In the UK, there were 
approximately 16 485 000 smart meters operating in domestic and small commercial 
premises, as of the end of December 2019 [25]. 
 
From the perspective of both cyber security and security of supply, the adoption of AMI 
incurs significant potential vulnerabilities. These range from the compromise of 
consumer privacy by the inference of behaviour from energy consumption patterns, to 
the disruptive injection of false data, in the case that measurements from smart meters  
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Figure 1.9: Smart metering and smart grid return on investments [20] 
 
are used to inform distribution network control and automation. Where a remote 
supply disconnection facility is included within the smart meter, this represents a 
critical further vulnerability [26]–[28]. 
 
In the United States, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has 
issued guidelines for security in smart grid infrastructure, including smart meters [29]. 
In turn, these guidelines cite existing standards for more general cyber security, for 
example the Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) Minimum Security 
Requirements for Federal Information and Information Systems [30], and Security 
Requirements for Cryptographic Modules [30], commonly known as FIPS 140-2. Such 
standards are readily applicable to AMI, owing to its close relation to existing, security-
critical infrastructure, such as that for smart payment cards. 
 
In 2012, the European Commission issued recommendations outlining the necessity 
for the mitigation of risks to privacy, personal data and security in the course of smart 
metering deployment [31]. An expert working group established by the European 
Commission, within its Smart Grids Task Force [32], has also issued broad cyber 
security guidance on smart grids, including AMI [33]. 
 
In the UK, the current Smart Metering Equipment Technical Specifications (SMETS 2) 
[34], issued by the Department of Energy & Climate Change (DECC), stipulate basic 
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security functions required of smart metering equipment, for example the support of 
specific cryptographic algorithms, and the secure storage of security credentials. The 
specification is supported by companion documents from other UK Government 
bodies, for example guidance on achieving certification under the National Cyber 
Security Centre’s (NCSC) Commercial Product Assurance (CPA) scheme, issued by the 
former Communications-Electronic Security Group (CESG) [35]. This extends the DECC 
specification to outline the required behaviour and response of smart metering 
equipment in order to mitigate typical vulnerabilities and attacks. 
 
Despite such guidelines and specifications, cyber security attacks have been 
demonstrated against commercially deployed smart meters in both the United States 
[36] and Europe [37], [38]. 
 
1.2 - Research objectives and structure 
 
1.2.1 - Research objectives 
 
The objective of the research described in this thesis was to investigate the impact of 
low-carbon technologies such as distributed, renewable generation on distribution 
networks, to demonstrate the use of smart metering in mitigating this impact, and to 
examine the issue of cyber security in the context of AMI. Particular contributions 
include: 
 
• The development of a hardware smart meter test bed platform on which functions 
both within the capacity of existing smart meters, and expected to be within the 
capacity of future smart meters, may be tested. 
 
• The development of a hardware-in-the-loop test rig, incorporating hardware smart 
meter test beds, the infrastructure required for WAN communication with the meters 
and for SCADA communication, and a Real Time Digital Simulator (RTDS) simulating 
a section of distribution network. 
 
• The demonstration of a closed-loop control system which mitigates the impact of a 
high penetration of solar PV generation and electric vehicle charging on a section of 
distribution network, informed by real-time measurements from smart meters, and 
effected by a distribution transformer equipped with an on-load tap changer (OLTC). 
 
• The demonstration of a cyber security attack in which a security vulnerability present 
in a commercially deployed smart meter is analysed, and exploited in a manner 
which permits unauthorised electronic access to the device. 
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1.2.2 - Thesis structure 
 
Subsequent chapters are structured as follows: 
 
• Chapter 2 examines the state of the art in the impact of low-carbon technologies 
such as distributed, renewable generation on distribution networks, the technical 
strategies available to mitigate these impacts, and their relative merits, the 
architecture of the control systems used to effect such strategies, and the cyber 
security issues pertinent to smart grids and AMI in particular. 
 
• Chapter 3 describes the design, development and commissioning of a hardware-in-
the-loop test rig to demonstrate the use of smart meter measurements for 
distribution network control, and incorporating multiple hardware smart meter test 
beds, the infrastructure required for WAN communication with the meters and for 
SCADA communication, and a Real Time Digital Simulator simulating a section of 
distribution network. The smart meter test bed platform developed permits the 
execution of custom firmware functions, and for the configuration of a wide range of 
measurement and communications parameters as required for a particular 
experiment. 
 
• Chapter 4 describes the use of the smart meter test rig to demonstrate the 
implementation of real-time voltage control within a low voltage (LV) network. This 
employs the hardware, and builds on the foundation software and firmware, 
described in Chapter 3. A simplified LV network model is developed for execution on 
a Real Time Digital Simulator. The development of a voltage alarm firmware function 
for the smart meter test bed platform described in Chapter 3, and a voltage 
controller, is described. Finally, the operation of the controller is demonstrated in 
case studies illustrating scenarios of heavy loading, high levels of distributed 
generation, heavy, imbalanced loading, and the conflicting requirements of a 
combination of heavy loading and high levels of distributed generation. 
 
• Chapter 5 describes the analysis of the cyber security vulnerabilities of a 
commercially deployed smart electricity meter resulting from inadequate provision 
for the protection of WAN communication, and for authentication when establishing 
connections with the local communications interface of the meter. These 
vulnerabilities are exploited, and are demonstrated to permit unauthorised 
electronic access to the meter. Recommendations are made of measures to mitigate 
the vulnerabilities identified and exploited. 
 
• Chapter 6 provides a conclusion of the research undertaken, and identifies 
pertinent, future research avenues, further to this work. 
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2 - Literature review 
 
2.1 - Introduction 
 
The techniques employed for conventional network control, as well as the state of the 
art of the impact of distributed generation, strategies to mitigate this impact including 
the use of smart metering, and cyber security issues pertinent to smart grids and 
advanced metering infrastructure (AMI), are presented. 
 
Subsequent sections are structured as follows: 
 
• Section 2.2 examines the control techniques employed on conventional distribution 
networks, in the absence of a high penetration of distributed generation. 
 
• Section 2.3 examines the impact of distributed generation on voltage regulation, 
power quality, and system protection, along with the potentially conflicting impact of 
electric vehicle (EV) charging. 
 
• Section 2.4 examines control strategies to mitigate the impact of distributed 
generation on distribution networks, including the use of smart metering.  
 
• Section 2.5 examines the architecture of schemes to mitigate the impact of 
distributed generation on distribution networks. 
 
• Section 2.6 examines the basis for cyber security attacks on smart meters (SMs) and 
AMI, as well as the vulnerabilities of such systems, and published attacks. 
 
2.2 - Conventional distribution network control 
 
Voltage control has been employed in conventional distribution network control in 
order to provide a voltage at the connection point of customers which is compliant 
with applicable standards, for example The Electricity Safety, Quality and Continuity 
Regulations 2002 [39] in the UK. Such control is required to accommodate the impact 
of varying demand on the voltage drop across transformers and conductors, as power 
is conveyed through the distribution network from high voltage (HV), through medium 
voltage (MV), to low voltage (LV). This is illustrated in Figure 2.1 [40]. 
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Figure 2.1: Voltage regulation on MV and LV networks. a: Simplified distribution 
network diagram. b: MV and LV network voltage variation [40] 
 
The above figure shows the voltage drop across the MV and LV feeders and the MV/LV 
transformer, and the compensatory boost provided by the tap setting of the MV/LV 
transformer. 
 
The principal mechanism of voltage control on conventional UK distribution networks 
is the variation of transformer tap setting. In the case of HV/MV, or primary 
transformers, this is typically achieved by means of on-load tap changers (OLTCs), 
operating automatically under load in order to maintain busbar voltage within an 
acceptable range. In the case of MV/LV transformers, this is typically achieved by 
means of manual, off-load tap selection [40], [41]. 
 
2.2.1 - Automatic voltage control 
 
A conventional automatic voltage control (AVC) scheme for the control of OLTC-
equipped HV/MV transformers is illustrated in Figure 2.2 [42]. 
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Figure 2.2: Basic AVC scheme [42] 
 
Given the voltage set-point USET, the control scheme in the above figure acts to maintain 
the busbar voltage Uo within the range: 
 
  (2.1)
 
where the lower boundary ULB is defined as: 
 
  (2.2)
 
and the upper boundary UUB is defined as: 
 
 (2.3)
 
The bandwidth element serves to prevent hunting of the control scheme. This can arise 
if a tap change performed to correct for what is deemed to be a low busbar voltage, 
results in what is deemed to be a high busbar voltage, or vice versa, resulting in a 
continuous sequence of alternate tap-change operations. Accordingly, a bandwidth of 
just under twice the transformer tap step is typically employed. The time-delay element 
serves to prevent the control scheme performing tap-change operations on the basis of 
brief voltage variations, and to limit the total number operations, with the associated 
wear on the tap changer mechanism and contacts [40]. 
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2.2.2 - Line drop compensation 
 
AVC schemes may be extended to account for the resistance and reactance of the 
feeder supplied by the transformer, and the current demand, known as line drop 
compensation (LDC) [40], [41]. This is illustrated in Figure 2.3 [42]: 
 
 
Figure 2.3: AVC scheme with LDC [42] 
 
Given the voltage set-point USET, the control scheme in the above figure acts to maintain 
the voltage at the feeder-end load centre ULC with the range: 
 
  (2.4)
 
where the lower and upper boundaries are defined as per Equations (2.2) and (2.3) 
respectively. In addition to the busbar voltage, the load is also considered under this 
scheme, based on measured current, the resistive and reactive set-points RSET and XSET, 
derived from the ratios of the voltage and current transformers, and the feeder 
resistance and reactance, RL and XL. 
 
2.2.3 - Voltage regulators and capacitor banks 
 
In order to compensate for excessive voltage drop at critical points, voltage regulators 
and capacitor banks have sometimes been employed on UK distribution networks. The 
voltage regulators are typically autotransformers, equipped with OLTCs. The capacitor 
banks may be permanently connected and of a fixed value, or switched in order to 
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provide reactive power compensation and boost voltage according to demand [40]–
[43]. 
 
2.3 - The impact of distributed generation 
 
The principal impacts of distributed generation (DG) on distribution networks may be 
categorised as follows [44]–[50]: 
 
• Voltage regulation: DG may cause a voltage rise at the point of connection. The 
additional demand of other low-carbon technologies, for example EV charging or 
heat pumps, if these are located elsewhere on a distribution network, may present a 
conflicting technical impact, compounding the issue of voltage regulation. Reverse 
power flow resulting from a high DG penetration may also result in undesirable 
behaviour in voltage regulation control schemes, for example LDC. 
 
• Power quality: Transient voltage events such as dips and swells may result from 
sudden variation in the output of DG sources. DG sources interfaced to the network 
by means of power electronics may introduce harmonic distortion. Resonance or 
other interactions may also occur between DG sources and other elements of the 
distribution network, including voltage control systems. The uneven distribution of 
single-phase DG sources across phases, particularly on LV feeders, may result in 
voltage imbalance. 
 
• Network losses: DG may reduce network losses by offsetting demand with local 
generation. However, if generation significantly exceeds local demand, with 
associated reverse power flow, losses may be increased. The thermal limits of 
distribution transformers and cables may limit the penetration of DG, as a result of 
increased power flow. 
 
• System protection: DG may result in increased fault current levels on a distribution 
network. Furthermore, adding additional power sources to a distribution network 
may alter the pattern of power flow, and power flow in the opposite direction to 
conventional operation may occur. DG may also energise a network, or part of it, 
which is otherwise expected to be isolated from the upstream network. 
 
Of the impacts listed above, the effect of DG on voltage regulation, the power quality 
issue of voltage imbalance, and system protection, along with the potentially 
conflicting impact of EV charging on distribution networks, are considered in further 
detail in the following sections. 
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2.3.1 - Voltage regulation 
 
Injection of real power into a distribution network by a DG source results in a voltage 
rise at the point of connection [46], [51]. The regulatory limits prescribing voltage on a 
distribution network may result in voltage rise being the limiting factor to the 
penetration of DG. In a simple, radial feeder, the voltage rise caused by a DG source at 
its point of connection may be approximated as [45], [52], [53]: 
 
 (2.5)
 
where PG and QG are the real and reactive power output of the DG source, PL and QL are 
the real and reactive power dissipation of the load, R and X are the resistance and 
reactance of the feeder, and V is the line voltage at the connection point of the DG 
source [45]. From this, it can be seen that the effect on voltage of DG sources located 
further from the substation will be more significant than those located closer to it. It 
can also be seen that whilst the injection of active power will result in a voltage rise, 
the injection or consumption of reactive power by the DG source will also result in an 
increase or decrease in voltage, respectively [46], [51]. At present, however, standards 
prescribing the operation and connection of small scale DG sources typically restrict 
their power factor to approximately unity, such as 1.00 ± 0.05 in the case of 
Engineering Recommendation G83/2 in the UK [54], and an average, lagging power 
factor of no less than 0.90, at 50 % load, in the case of IEC 61727 [55]. 
 
Real power injected by DG sources serves to offset the power dissipation of local loads 
which would otherwise be served by the upstream network. If the power injection of 
DG sources exceeds the power dissipation of local loads then reverse power flow, 
relative to the direction of flow in the absence of DG, will occur. A simplified, radial 
feeder is illustrated in Figure 2.4 [56]. 
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Figure 2.4: Simplified distribution system model [56] 
 
Given a fixed load, the reduction and subsequent reversal of real power flow in such a 
network, as a result of increasing power injection, will cause the voltage at the point of 
connection to rise until a limit is reached. This is shown in Figure 2.5 [56]. 
 
 
Figure 2.5: Voltage at the load bus and line current as a function of PLINE [56] 
 
The effect which DG may have on the voltage profile of a radial feeder under different 
levels of demand is shown in Figure 2.6 [50]. 
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Figure 2.6: Voltage profile on an LV feeder. The second column shows the effect of 
solar photovoltaic (PV) inverters [50] 
 
In [57], Ingram et al. present a generic, UK distribution network. This model extends 
from a 33 kV, three-phase source, to four 400 V, radial feeders, representative of 
urban, low voltage distribution systems. A single line, overview diagram of this 
network is illustrated in Figure 2.7 [45]. 
 
 
Figure 2.7: Single-line diagram of the UK Generic Network [45] 
 
DG sources were modelled as single-phase, with a rating of 1.1 kW. DG Penetration is 
defined as the percentage of customers with these sources installed, such that 100 % 
penetration represents all customers having 1.1 kW of generation capacity, and 200 % 
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penetration represents all customers having 2.2 kW. A minimum load of 0.16 kVA per 
customer was considered. Of the four LV feeders, three were modelled as lumped 
loads, with the fourth represented in detail. The simulation study found that, assuming 
a uniform distribution of generation, an upper voltage limit of 10 % was exceeded at 
between 40 % and 50 % penetration of the 1.1 kW DG sources operating at rated 
output, under minimum load conditions, and dependent on whether a constant 
impedance or constant power model was used to represent system loads. Results of 
the low voltage feeder remote end voltages, for the constant impedance and constant 
power load models, are shown in Figure 2.8 and Figure 2.9 respectively [57]. 
 
 
Figure 2.8: Voltage variation at the remote end of a 400 V feeder with increasing 
generation penetration, using a constant impedance equivalent load on the MV system 
[57] 
  
 
Figure 2.9: Voltage variation at the remote end of a 400 V feeder with increasing 
generation penetration, using a constant power equivalent load on the MV system [57] 
 
The study of [57] further illustrated that local concentration of DG sources on a 
particular feeder results in an upper voltage limit being reached at the feeder end at a 
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lower level of DG penetration than can be achieved with uniform distribution of DG 
sources. 
 
In [45], Trichakis et al. also performed a simulation study, using the generic, UK 
distribution network presented in [57] and illustrated in Figure 2.7. This study 
concluded that, assuming a uniformly distributed, minimum load of 61.44 kW at unity 
power factor, the maximum, uniformly distributed generation which could be 
supported by the network was 185 kW, before an upper voltage rise limit of 10 % was 
exceeded. The study further found that this voltage rise limited DG penetration before 
the cable and transformer thermal limits, and voltage regulation limits, were reached. 
Clustering of the DG sources to one of the four LV feeders was found to reduce the 
maximum generation which could be accommodated to 48 kW, whilst clustering of the 
DG sources at the ends of the LV feeders was found to limit the maximum generation 
to 28 kW, before a 10 % voltage rise limit was reached in both cases. 
 
In [45], Trichakis et al. also performed a study based on an existing UK, urban, 
underground, LV distribution network. The network was modelled in Manitoba HVDC 
Research Centre’s PSCAD. A single line, overview diagram of this network is illustrated 
in Figure 2.10 [45]. 
 
 
Figure 2.10: Single-line diagram of the case study public UK network [45] 
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The network illustrated in Figure 2.10 hosts 198 single-phase customers, as well as 
public street lighting. For the purpose of the study conducted, all demand is attributed 
to customer loads, with a minimum demand of 0.375 kW per customer at unity power 
factor. The maximum DG which can be accommodated on this network before a 
voltage rise limit of 10 % is reached is concluded to be 204 kW, or 1.03 kW per 
customer, with generation distributed uniformly across all customers, and under 
minimum loading. With the DG sources distributed uniformly across the 107 customers 
of the second LV feeder, the maximum generation which could be accommodated 
before this voltage rise limit was reached was found to be 85 kW, or 0.79 kW per 
customer. 
 
In [58], Barbato et al. present the results of LV network monitoring by means of smart 
meters and MV/LV substation sensors, under the European FP7 project IDE4L. The 
network is located in the city of Brescia, Northern Italy, and hosted 299 customers, 118 
with residential PV installations, across ten feeders. Figure 2.11 [58] shows the voltage 
of the second phase of Feeder 1 of this network, as well as the voltage measured at the 
connection points of two customers on the same phase, over one day. 
 
 
Figure 2.11: Voltage of Feeder 1-phase B compared with the voltage measured on 
customer 4 and 7 connected on the same phase. October 10th, 2016 [58] 
 
It can be seen that the voltage at the connection point of customer CU04, with a PV 
installation, exhibits a significant rise during the afternoon period of maximum solar 
irradiance, compared to that of customer CU07, without a PV installation. Figure 2.12 
[58] shows the voltages presented in Figure 2.11, over a period of one week. It is 
observed in [58] that, whilst PV generation is responsible for a significant voltage rise, 
the customer voltages recorded were within the 230 V ± 10 % range of EN 50160 [59]. 
2 - Literature review 
22 
 
Figure 2.12: Histogram of one week of voltage measurements (Oct. 10th – Oct. 16th) 
[58] 
 
The Low Voltage Network Solutions project [60], commissioned by distribution network 
operator (DNO) Electricity North West (ENWL), monitored substation voltage and 
imbalance, as well as a number of other parameters, on 200 substations across the 
ENWL network during 2012 and early 2013. Of these substations, 28 comprised pole 
mounted transformers, and 172 ground mounted, with a total of over 1000 LV feeders. 
With regard to the penetration of PV, the project found that 61 % of the substations 
assessed had between 0.2 % and 49 % of customers with PV installations, with an 
average PV installation capacity of 3 kW. Notably, the report found that in 7 % of the 
substations, busbar voltages were consistently above 253 V (1.1 p.u.), based on ten-
minute sampling. Further to the project, and to estimate the impact of a greater 
penetration of PV generation, a probabilistic impact assessment was performed on 25 
ENWL LV networks, with a total of 128 feeders [61]. Under this assessment, PV 
installations were modelled with random sizes, distributed according to the statistics 
of registered PV installations in the UK at the time of the study [62]. Irradiance was 
based on actual measurements recorded by Whitworth Meteorological Observatory at 
The University of Manchester. In considering the effect of a range of penetration levels 
of PV from 0 to 100 %, defined as the percentage of customers with the technology 
installed, a five-minute resolution of the PV data was used with a Monte Carlo method, 
and 100 simulations per penetration level. In the feeders with more than 25 customers 
connected, the percentage of feeders exhibiting technical issues of non-conformance 
with the one-week or ten-minute average voltage ranges of EN 50160 [59], or 
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exceeding the capacity of the transformer or conductors, at any level of penetration, is 
shown in Figure 2.13 [61]. Other technologies considered in the study, including EVs, 
are also shown. 
 
 
Figure 2.13: Feeders with technical problems per technology (more than 25 customers) 
[61] 
 
The above figure shows that voltage issues were found in 64 % of the feeders modelled 
with up to 100 % of PV penetration. Figure 2.14 [61] shows the percentage of the 
occurrence of either voltage or thermal limits as the first issue in the case of increasing 
PV penetration on the feeders found to exhibit either technical issue. Again, other 
technologies considered in the study, including EVs, are also shown. 
 
 
Figure 2.14: First technical issue among the feeders with problems per technology [61] 
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This above figure shows that, in all cases where a feeder is found to exhibit a technical 
issue, the voltage impact of PV generation is a more significant limit than the thermal 
constraints of the transformer and conductors.  
 
2.3.2 - Voltage imbalance 
 
The report System Integration of Additional Micro-generation [63], commissioned by 
the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), asserts that the stochastic model 
presumed for the distribution of single-phase loads across the population of customers 
served by a three-phase feeder may reasonably be applied to the distribution of single-
phase generation sources, such as PV systems, on an LV network. However, where 
imbalance in the distribution of single-phase DG sources across phases does exist, this 
can cause a voltage imbalance between phases [64]. This effect will be most 
pronounced at downstream points on radial feeders [65]–[67]. As well as resulting in 
increased losses from neutral conductor heating, a voltage imbalance is a particular 
issue for three-phase motors [64], [68] and variable-frequency drives [69]. 
Furthermore, the same power flow, imbalanced across phases, will result in less 
'headroom' between the lowest or highest phase and prescribed limits, compared to a 
balanced condition [67], [70]. 
 
True voltage imbalance is defined in the UK [71], and Europe [59], as the ratio of the 
negative sequence voltage component to the positive sequence voltage component, 
expressed as a percentage. This is referred to as the voltage unbalance factor (% VUF): 
 
 
 
(2.6)
 
The IEEE defines an approximation to this, the phase voltage unbalance rate [72], [73]: 
 
 
 
(2.7)
 
In the UK, Engineering Recommendation P29 defines a % VUF limit of 1.3 %, with up to 
2 % permitted for less than one minute [71]. EN 50160 defines a range of 2 % for 95 % 
of the ten-minute average period over one week [59]. 
 
In [57], analysis of the impact of imbalanced connection of DG sources was conducted 
by only connecting generation sources to phase A of the 400 V feeder modelled in 
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detail. The resulting % VUF, for the constant impedance and constant power load 
models, are shown in Figure 2.15 and Figure 2.16 respectively [57]. 
 
 
Figure 2.15: Voltage imbalance results due to connection of generation on one phase 
of a 400V feeder, using constant impedance equivalent load on MV system [57] 
 
 
Figure 2.16: Voltage imbalance results due to connection of generation on one phase 
of a 400V feeder, using constant power equivalent load on MV system [57] 
 
It can be seen from the above figure that the % VUF limit of 1.3 % defined by P29 [71] is 
exceeded with a penetration of 1.1 kW DG sources of approximately 150 %. 
 
In [45], Trichakis et al. also examined the issue of imbalance, using the generic, UK 
distribution network presented in [57] and illustrated in Figure 2.7. It was found that, 
in the case of uniformly distributed, unity power factor DG sources, and at minimum, 
uniformly distributed unity power factor load conditions of 61.44 kW or 0.16 kW per 
customer, a maximum of 47.8 kW of generation could be supported on one phase of 
one feeder before a % VUF limit of 1.3 % was exceeded. In the case of the existing UK, 
underground, LV distribution network model also considered in [45] and illustrated in 
Figure 2.10, the maximum generation which could be supported, uniformly distributed 
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on one phase of the second feeder was approximately the same as for the generic, UK 
network, at 47.8 kW. This also reflects the maximum penetration of 150 % of 1.1 kW 
DG sources found in [57]. 
 
2.3.3 - System protection 
 
In addition to the effect it may have on voltage, the introduction of distributed 
generation onto a distribution feeder may increase the magnitude of fault current flow 
in the feeder to which it is connected, and in adjacent feeders. It may also have the 
effect of changing the direction of fault current flow. Such impacts may require the 
uprating of assets such as transformers and conductors, and also have the potential to 
cause a number of issues with the operation of protection devices. Existing protection 
schemes predicated on one-way current flow may no longer be adequate to protect 
feeders hosting a high penetration of distributed generation, and an increase in the 
use of dedicated communication to coordinate protection may be required [49], [74]. 
Protection operation issues of particular concern are the following [44], [46], [75], [76]: 
 
• Unintended islanding 
 
• Protection blinding 
 
• False tripping 
 
• Reclosure impediment 
 
These issues are considered in further detail in the following sections. 
 
2.3.3.1 - Unintended islanding 
 
Islanding occurs when a section of distribution network no longer connected to the 
upstream network continues to be energised by distributed generation connected to it. 
Although circumstances exist under which this may be desirable, it may present 
considerable hazards to equipment, those working on the network, and consumers, 
particularly if it is unintended. The most fundamental hazard is injury to consumers or 
those working on the network arising from an assumption that, since the local 
distribution network is no longer connected to the upstream network, it is no longer 
energised [49], [76], [77]. In the event that protection devices have isolated the section 
of distribution network from the upstream network due to the detection of a fault on 
the local network, DG sources may continue to contribute current to the fault, causing 
further damage [49]. A compounding issue is that, whilst it may be sufficient to cause 
damage, the fault current contribution of individual DG sources may not be sufficient 
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to trigger protection which would otherwise isolate the fault, in a timely manner [46], 
[74], [76]. 
 
Due to what may be a significant, step change in the load presented to DG sources on 
a section of network at the point that it becomes islanded, and also dependent on the 
control scheme of the individual DG sources, the voltage and frequency of the islanded 
network section may deviate rapidly and substantially from their values prior to 
disconnection from the upstream network. This presents a power quality issue which 
may damage assets and consumer equipment. It also presents a challenge to 
resynchronisation with the upstream network, prior to reconnection to it, and a 
considerable hazard if reconnection is attempted without resynchronisation. This 
requires dedicated protection infrastructure which would not have been required in the 
absence of DG sources [49], [74], [76], [77]. 
 
Deviation of voltage and frequency values following islanding of a section of network 
are currently the principal means by which islanding is detected [49], [77]. Standards 
prescribing the operation of DG sources, such as IEC 61727 [55] and IEEE 1547 [78], 
require the inclusion of islanding prevention measures in order that the sources 
quickly cease to energise a section of network if it becomes islanded. In the event of a 
rapid deviation of voltage and frequency values, ‘passive’ protection may be employed 
to isolate the DG source from the network when these values fall outside of an 
acceptable window. In the event that the match of load and DG capacity on the 
islanded network section is sufficiently good that the deviation of voltage and 
frequency occurs too slowly for islanding detection to occur in an acceptable time, 
‘active’ protection may be employed. Under such a scheme, the control scheme of the 
otherwise voltage following DG source is designed to deviate more rapidly from the 
voltage and frequency values prior to islanding, by design. This enables the anti-
islanding protection to detect values which fall outside of an acceptable window, and 
hence an islanded condition, more quickly than would otherwise be the case [49], [77]. 
 
In the case that auto-reclosing is employed, it is imperative that anti-islanding 
protection operates quickly enough that temporary faults are not sustained by the fault 
current contribution of DG sources during the dead time of the recloser. Such onerous 
timing requirements may preclude the use of voltage and frequency deviation to detect 
islanding, and instead require the use of dedicated communication between DG 
sources and distribution network protection equipment [74], [76]. 
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2.3.3.2 - Protection blinding 
 
Protection blinding, also known as protection under-reach, occurs as a result of the 
contribution of fault current from DG sources to a fault, in addition to the fault current 
from the upstream network. Consequently, the total current at the fault location will 
increase, while the contribution from the upstream network will decrease [44], [76]. 
Dependent on the impedance of the upstream network, the DG sources, and assets 
such as transformers and conductors, the current contribution of the upstream 
network may be reduced to such a degree in the event of a fault that protection does 
not detect it [74], [75]. This is illustrated in Figure 2.17 [44]. 
 
 
Figure 2.17: Principle of blinding of protection [44] 
 
2.3.3.3 - False tripping 
 
Where two or more feeders are supplied from a common substation bus, DG sources 
on one feeder may contribute fault current to a fault occurring on an adjacent feeder, 
via that bus. In addition to increasing the total fault current, the contribution of current 
from the feeder on which no fault is present may be sufficient to trigger the protection 
of that feeder, isolating it unnecessarily [44], [49], [75], [76], [79]. This is illustrated in 
Figure 2.18 [44]. Directional protection may be used to prevent erroneous tripping of 
this sort [44], [46], [49], [76], [80]. 
 
 
Figure 2.18: Principle of false tripping [44] 
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2.3.3.4 - Reclosure impediment 
 
Since 80 % of faults occurring on distribution networks are temporary in nature, 
reclosers are widely employed, particularly to protect overhead circuits [44], [80]. 
However, DG sources may continue to supply fault current to a fault on a section of 
network during the dead time of the recloser protecting it, preventing arc extinction 
and sustaining the fault [44], [74]–[76]. 
 
In protection coordination schemes under which an upstream recloser is intended to 
prevent downstream protection devices such as fuses from operating in the case of 
temporary faults, the additional fault current contributed by DG sources may cause the 
downstream protection to operate before the recloser can operate [44], [49]. This is 
illustrated in Figure 2.19 [49]. 
 
 
Figure 2.19: How fault contributions from other feeder energy sources such as PV can 
interfere with fuse and circuit breaker coordination in fuse-saving schemes [49] 
 
Even during the dead time of a recloser, typically in the order of 0.3–0.6 s [81], 
significant deviation of voltage and frequency may occur in an islanded section of 
network, energised by DG sources present on it. This loss of synchronisation with the 
upstream network presents a significant hazard upon reconnection [74], [76], [77]. 
 
2.3.4 - The impact of electric vehicle charging 
 
EV charging, not considering future vehicle-to-grid (V2G) technology, represents a 
significant potential load on distribution networks. A typical, residential charging point 
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has a rating of 16 A or 3.68 kW [82]. In [70], Rodriguez-Calvo et al. conclude that, 
since EV charging is expected to take place predominantly at night, during the period 
in which demand from other loads is typically lowest, it does not present such an 
immediate issue to voltage compliance as PV adoption. In [83], an aggregated charge 
profile for plug-in hybrid electric vehicle (PHEVs) is presented which reflects this, 
shown in Figure 2.20. However, it is noteworthy that such a profile is approximately an 
inverse of daily solar irradiance and, hence, potential PV output, and EV charging does 
have the potential to result in under-voltage conditions, particularly at the ends of 
long, radial LV feeders, or on already heavily loaded networks [84], [85]. 
 
 
Figure 2.20: PHEV Charge Profile (Hour 1 represents 12:01 a.m. to 1:00 a.m. Hour 24 
represents 11:01 p.m. to 12:00 a.m.) [83] 
 
Even if the demand of EV charging does not result in under-voltage conditions on a 
distribution network, it has the potential to affect voltage regulation and balance. 
 
In [84], a study of the impact of EV charging was undertaken, based on the generic and 
existing UK, LV distribution networks presented in [57] and [45], and illustrated in 
Figure 2.7 and Figure 2.10 respectively. Customer load, not including EV charging, was 
modelled according to half-hourly data provided by the UK Energy Research Centre 
(UKERC). The study considered a slow charging rate of 1.3 kW, and a fast rate of 
9.6 kW, with a total of 66 customers using EVs, as per the penetration scenarios 
examined in the study. Figure 2.21 [84] shows the load effect of EV charging on a 
secondary transformer of the existing UK, LV distribution network, on both weekdays 
and weekends. 
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Figure 2.21: 100 % home slow-charging scenario for the UK existing LV distribution 
network during winter [84] 
 
It can be seen from the above figure that the transformer rating is exceeded by EV 
charging under this scenario, on winter evenings. The study further found that EV 
charging resulted in transformer overloading in both autumn and winter when the 
generic UK network model was employed. Customer voltage was not found to exceed 
current UK voltage limits [39] under any of the scenarios considered. Under the worst-
case scenario presented in Figure 2.21, the feeder end customer voltages were found 
to be approximately 236 V in the case of the generic UK network, and 239 V in the 
case of the existing UK network, with a substation voltage of approximately 250 V. 
With regard to voltage regulation, under the worst-case scenario, a voltage difference 
of approximately 6 % was found between the substation and feeder end in the case of 
the generic UK network, and approximately 4.7 % in the case of the existing UK 
network. The study also found that a maximum of approximately 48 kW of charging 
load may be accommodated on one phase of one of the 400 V feeders before a % VUF 
limit of 1.3 % [71] is exceeded. However, the report concludes that it is transformer 
loading which is expected to be the limiting factor with regard to EV penetration, 
although brief overloading may be tolerated by distribution transformers without the 
requirement for upgrading by the DNO. 
 
Further to the Low Voltage Network Solutions project [60], commissioned by DNO 
Electricity North West (ENWL), and to estimate the impact of prospective EV adoption, a 
probabilistic impact assessment was performed on 25 ENWL LV networks, with a total 
of 128 feeders [61]. Under this assessment, EV profiles were created based on the 
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result of a one-year EV field trial conducted in Dublin. In the feeders with more than 25 
customers connected, the percentage of feeders exhibiting technical issues of non-
conformance with the one-week or ten-minute average voltage ranges of EN 50160 
[59], or exceeding the capacity of the transformer or conductors, at any level of 
penetration, is shown in Figure 2.13 [61]. The figure shows that both issues of voltage 
non-conformance and issues of thermal overloading of network assets were found in 
approximately 25 % of the feeders modelled with up to 100 % of EV penetration. Figure 
2.14 [61] shows the percentage of the occurrence of either voltage or thermal limits as 
the first issue in the case of increasing EV penetration on the feeders found to exhibit 
either technical issue. This figure shows that in this study, in all cases where a feeder 
is found to exhibit a technical issue, the thermal impact of EV adoption was slightly 
more significant than the voltage impact, presenting the limiting factor to EV 
penetration in approximately 65 % of cases. 
 
2.4 - Strategies for distribution network voltage 
control 
 
The principal strategies for voltage control in distribution networks hosting a large 
penetration of DG, also considering the potentially conflicting impacts of other low-
carbon technologies (LCTs) such as EVs, may be categorised as follows [46], [85]–[90]: 
 
• Network reinforcement: Reduction of the resistance and reactance of distribution 
network feeders reduces the effect of real and reactive power flow on voltage, as per 
Equation (2.5). 
 
• Curtailment: The real power injection of DG sources may be constrained in order to 
limit the resulting voltage rise. 
 
• Demand-side management (DSM): Appliances, domestic and commercial heating and 
cooling, and EV charging, may be controlled in order to optimally schedule their 
demand. 
 
• On-load tap changers: By changing the distribution transformer tap position under 
load, busbar voltage may be controlled to reflect the balance of generation and 
demand on a feeder at a given time. 
 
• Reactive power flow control: By absorbing reactive power, DG sources may mitigate 
the voltage rise resulting from real power injection, as per Equation (2.5). In the case 
that conflicting requirements exist, for example an over-voltage condition on a 
feeder resulting from a high penetration of PV and an under-voltage condition on an 
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adjacent feeder supplied by the same busbar resulting from high demand, injection 
of reactive power by switched capacitors may be employed to raise the voltage on 
the feeder exhibiting under-voltage, as per Equation (2.5). 
 
• Storage: Local storage of real power from, for example, PV generation, may be used 
to limit the instantaneous real power injection into a feeder. Energy stored and 
consumed locally in this way does not contribute to active power flow in the feeder. 
 
In all cases of active control, the distributed measurements offered by smart meters 
located at the periphery of the distribution network enhance the scope for, and 
effectiveness of, coordinated control [46], [85], [91]. 
 
Of the control strategies listed above, the use of OLTCs, reactive power flow control by 
DG sources, and energy storage, are considered in further detail in the following 
sections. 
 
2.4.1 - On-load tap changers 
 
On-load tap changers have not typically been used at secondary substation level in the 
UK and Europe [92], [93]. However, the requirement for voltage control in the presence 
of high DG penetration on distribution networks and, in particular, to mitigate the 
voltage rise associated with real power injection by these technologies, increasingly 
justifies the costs of additional transformer, communications and control 
infrastructure, and of the wear of tap-change operations [51], [94]. The implementation 
of OLTCs with electronic commutation in addition to [95] or replacing mechanical 
commutation [96]–[100], may mitigate these issues by offering faster commutation 
without mechanical wear or arcing. The use of decoupled OLTCs, capable of changing 
the tap position of each phase independently, has also been proposed [101], [102].  
 
The performance of conventional AVC schemes, based on maintaining a constant 
busbar voltage, and LDC, in the presence of high penetrations of DG, have been 
examined in literature [42], [46], [49], [103], [104]. However, high penetrations of DG 
resulting in low load current and even reverse power flow may adversely affect such 
schemes [105]–[109]. Hence, control strategies have been presented which augment or 
supplant such control, as well as considering both time of day, significant due to the 
daily profile of solar irradiance, and the potential for distributed network voltage 
monitoring, even on LV networks, offered by technologies such as smart meters. In 
[103], a scheme by which historical voltage data from a feeder is used to augment 
more basic LDC control in the absence of real-time voltage measurements is proposed. 
In [106], conventional LDC is augmented by considering power flow direction. The use 
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of OLTCs in combination with reactive power control from DG sources, capacitors and 
distribution static compensators (DSTATCOMs) has also been examined [43], [110], 
[111], including with distributed voltage measurements [51], [112]. 
 
The DG DemoNet – Smart LV Grid project [113]–[116] considered three levels of OLTC 
control: That based only on voltage measurement at the local busbar, control based on 
distributed voltage measurements, and reactive power control of DG in addition to the 
OLTC. This was demonstrated in field trials on three Austrian LV networks. 
 
In [117], Li et al. propose a scheme whereby voltage measurements from points 
distributed along the feeder served by a transformer are used to generate a reference 
value for an AVC relay controlling an OLTC. The algorithm for this function is shown in 
Figure 2.22 [117], where Vref is the reference voltage provided to the AVC relay. 
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Figure 2.22: Automatic Voltage Reference Setting (AVRS) [117] 
 
It can be seen that this scheme considers whether an existing conflict between 
concurrent over-voltages and under-voltages exists, and whether a tap-change 
operation will result in further voltage violations. In [118], a similar algorithm to that 
that proposed in [117] was demonstrated which also considers the effect of multiple 
prospective tap-change operations, prior to issuing a new voltage set-point reference. 
This scheme was demonstrated on a model of a section of Finnish distribution network 
supporting both static loads and controllable DG, simulated on a Real Time Digital 
Simulator (RTDS) in order that closed-loop testing of the control algorithm could be 
performed on commercial distribution network automation hardware. The operation of 
the algorithm is shown in Figure 2.23 [118]. 
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Figure 2.23: The operation of the control algorithm in minimum loading conditions 
when substation voltage is the primary control variable [118] 
 
It can be seen that an increase in DG active power output results in an over-voltage 
condition to which the algorithm responds, issuing a voltage set-point which results in 
two tap-down operations, restoring the voltage to within limit. The disconnection of 
the DG subsequently results in an under-voltage condition to which the algorithm 
responds by issuing a voltage set-point which results in a single tap-up operation, 
restoring the voltage to within limits. 
 
In [93], Long et al. specifically consider the application of OLTCs to LV feeder control, 
with three possible control schemes: constant set-point, time based, and remote 
monitoring based. Under the constant set-point scheme, tap changes are made in 
order to maintain a busbar voltage as close as possible to the set-point. The time-
based scheme employs two set-points, representing peak and off-peak demand, and 
scheduled according to time of day and season. The remote monitoring scheme 
employs feeder end voltage readings, and categorises the proximity of these values to 
limits as green, orange, or red, representative of their severity. This is shown in Table 
2.1 [119]. An OLTC voltage set-point for the next control cycle, Vset i+1, is calculated as 
shown below, where Vbusbar i is the current busbar voltage, and ΔVi is a compensating 
voltage. 
 
  (2.8)
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The compensating voltage ΔVi is the product of the factor corresponding to the 
category of the maximum and minimum of all the feeder end voltages, taken from 
Table 2.1, and the voltage step of the OLTC. 
 
Table 2.1: Compensating voltage factor according to the voltage zones [119] 
 
 
In [93], the performance of the remote monitoring scheme was compared to that of the 
simpler fixed, and time-based set-point schemes using a model of a real, UK, 
residential LV network, operated by ENWL. This consisted of six radial, LV feeders, with 
a total of 351 single-phase customers, simulated in EPRI’s OpenDSS and MathWorks’ 
MATLAB. Customers were modelled with realistic load and PV generation profiles, with 
PV penetration defined as the percentage of the total number of customers with a PV 
installation. The OLTC bandwidth, the difference between the busbar and set-point 
voltage at which the OLTC will operate, was set at 2.2 %. The tap changer delay, the 
period for which the bandwidth must be exceeded before the OLTC will operate, was 
set at 120 s. With an even penetration of PV, the average, annual effect on voltage 
compliance of the remote monitoring-based control (RMC), constant set-point control 
(CSC), and time-based control (TBC) schemes, compared to compliance in the case of 
only off-load tap changer provision, is shown in Figure 2.24 [93]. The average daily 
number of tap changes for this period is shown in Figure 2.25 [93]. 
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Figure 2.24: Average customers with voltage problems - even PV penetration [93] 
 
 
Figure 2.25: Daily average number of tap changes - even PV penetration [93] 
 
It can be seen that under all control schemes, the OLTC significantly mitigates the 
voltage non-compliance issue of increasing PV penetration, when compared to an off-
load tap changer, and that employing remote monitoring in the control algorithm both 
increases the degree of this mitigation and reduces the total number of tap-change 
operations required. 
 
The remote monitoring based control scheme presented in [93] was deployed in a trial 
conducted by ENWL involving two secondary substations equipped with OLTCs [119]. 
Both had six feeders, with PV penetration of approximately 30 %. In this case, the OLTC 
bandwidth was set at 4.4 %, and the delay at 120 s. The set-point, busbar voltage, and 
tap position over the course of a midweek, May day at one of the two substations is 
shown in Figure 2.26 [93], [119]. 
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Figure 2.26: Actual tap operation at Landgate Substation [93], [119] 
 
2.4.2 - Reactive power control of distributed generation 
 
The X/R ratio in LV networks is low in comparison to MV networks, typically by an 
order of magnitude [120]–[122]. This reduces the capacity for voltage regulation by 
means of reactive power control [123]. The transfer of reactive power also results in 
increased system losses and loading of the DG sources [118], [124]. Indeed, the 
increased losses resulting from the power transfer associated with the use of reactive 
power exchange to limit voltage rise from real power injection may exceed the real 
power injection curtailment required to achieve the same effect [120]. 
 
In the case of reactive power control of DG sources such as PV inverters for the 
purpose of voltage regulation, the reactive power capacity of the DG source is limited 
by the total apparent capacity, and the active power output of the device. The 
operation envelope of such a DG source is shown in Figure 2.27 [51]. 
 
 
Figure 2.27: PQ-diagram of a generator (generator perspective) [51] 
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It can be seen from this figure that the vector sum of the active (P) and reactive (Q) 
power flows of the DG source must not exceed the total rating of the device (S). The 
limitation of active power export due to the use of reactive power flow for voltage 
control may have an undesirable economic impact [51]. 
 
In Germany, the capacity for reactive power absorption to aid voltage control is 
mandated for LV-connected PV inverters [125]. The standard, local reactive control rule 
is shown in Figure 2.28 [124], [125]. 
 
 
Figure 2.28: Standard local reactive control rule [124], [125] 
 
Under this control scheme, above 50 % of rated output, the PV inverter absorbs 
reactive power, up to a power factor of 0.95, in order to mitigate the voltage rise at its 
point of connection resulting from real power injection. 
 
In [124], [126]–[128], DG control schemes are proposed whereby the reactive power of 
a DG source is controlled in order to minimise the voltage rise at the point of 
connection. In [129], Carvalho et al. demonstrate such a DG control scheme on a 
simple MV feeder model representing a 20 km-long, 30 kV, 50 mm2, aluminium, 
overhead line. The feeder is considered both without load, and with a load of 5 MW 
and 2 MVAr. In both cases, the effect on voltage of the control of the DG reactive 
power by means of the proposed control scheme, as well as the effect of a constant 
leading or lagging power factor, is examined for a range of DG active power outputs. 
This is shown in Figure 2.29 [129]. 
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Figure 2.29: Bus voltage VG evolution with generator power for fixed transformer 
secondary voltage [129] 
 
The figure shows the effect of fixed leading or lagging power factor, and reactive 
power control, Q*, without load in the case of the upper curves, and with load in the 
case of the lower curves. It can be seen that, in this scenario, the local control of 
generator reactive power can be effective in the mitigation of voltage rise from the real 
power injection of DG. 
 
In [43], Liu et al. demonstrate an adverse impact of the use of local voltage control by 
means of reactive power control of PV. The study considers a model of an 
approximately six mile-long, 12.5 kV representative feeder, employing an OLTC at the 
substation, and a voltage regulator approximately two miles from the substation. The 
feeder supports a total of 7 lumped loads, totalling approximately 11 MVA, and 
representative of a mix of residential and commercial demand. PV penetration is 
defined as the percentage of local load. Figure 2.30 [43] shows the feeder voltage with 
50 % PV penetration, operating at rated power, and light loading, resulting in reverse 
active power flow. 
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Figure 2.30: 50 % PV penetration voltage profile with inverters controlling voltage [43] 
 
It can be seen that, despite the state of reverse power flow, voltage is well regulated 
along the length of the feeder. However, the absorption of reactive power in order to 
mitigate voltage rise results in considerable reactive power import to the feeder, with 
the consequence of increased feeder losses and increased reactive power demand from 
the upstream network. This is shown in Figure 2.31 [43]. 
 
 
Figure 2.31: 50 % PV penetration power profile with inverters controlling voltage [43] 
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2.4.3 - Energy storage 
 
Storage of surplus energy generated by DG at, or close to, the point of generation, 
negates the voltage rise that might otherwise result as a result of active power export, 
as well as the losses associated with power transfer, and the detrimental impact of, for 
example, reverse power flow [130]–[134]. 
 
Schemes have been presented in [130], [131], [135], [136] under which local battery 
storage is used to increase the PV hosting capacity of a network by mitigating effects 
such as voltage rise. In [123], this is achieved by the control of a combination of 
storage and PV inverter output. In [137], this is considered in the context of EVs, and 
in [138] in the case of public EV charging stations integrating energy storage. 
 
In [139], a scheme under which battery storage is controlled to mitigate voltage rise, 
with the priorities of minimising OLTC operations and system losses, is presented. The 
scheme was demonstrated using a hardware-in-the-loop test rig in which a controllable 
AC source and a battery-based energy storage system were interfaced to an RTDS 
simulating a distribution network model. 
 
In [140], a scheme for the integration of storage with a power electronic transformer at 
secondary distribution substation level was presented. However, in [141] it was 
concluded that placement of energy storage at customer level is more efficient than at 
grid level. 
 
In [142], the use of energy storage to mitigate voltage imbalance on a network hosting 
PV generation is demonstrated, under simulation, and on a laboratory, hardware test 
rig. 
 
2.5 - The architecture of distribution network 
control 
 
2.5.1 - Centralised vs decentralised control 
 
The architecture of systems used for distribution network control may be categorised 
according to the level of the electrical distribution network at which decisions are 
made. Existing networks are characterised by a centralised control architecture, in 
which control is effected primarily from a network control centre, or by automation at 
primary substations [87], [143], [144]. This is illustrated in Figure 2.32 [143]. 
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Figure 2.32: Centralised distribution network management system [143] 
 
Under a decentralised control architecture, network monitoring data, for example from 
smart meters, is stored and processed, and control decisions effected, at lower levels 
of the distribution network than in the case of a centralised architecture, for example 
at secondary substation level [87], [143], [144]. This is illustrated in Figure 2.33 [143]. 
 
Under autonomous PV inverter control schemes, control is effected at the very 
periphery of the distribution network, based on local measurements [123], [124], 
[145], [146]. It is important to consider, however, the mutual interaction between 
devices effecting autonomous, local control, and between such devices and centralised 
control systems [147]. In contrast to such local automation, schemes have been 
proposed whereby control is effected by PV inverters, but directed by a more 
centralised agent, coordinating a number of sources [110], [128]. 
 
In the case of distribution substations with OLTCs, local automation may be employed 
which augments or replaces existing control techniques, such as LDC. In [148], the 
SuperTAPP n+ scheme demonstrated in a trial by EDF Energy for the control of a 
network hosting DG is described. Under this scheme, OLTC control is based on 
measurements taken locally to the substation. Similarly, in [106], conventional LDC is 
extended to accommodate the potential for reverse power flow caused by DG. 
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Figure 2.33: Decentralised distribution network management system [143] 
 
Although processing may still take place at substation level, and control effected 
locally by, for example, an OLTC, distributed measurements may offer superior 
performance when compared to a control scheme based exclusively on local 
measurements. The DG DemoNet project [113]–[116] compared an OLTC control 
strategy based on local busbar voltage measurement with one based on distributed 
measurements from smart meters. Similarly, in [149], coordinated control schemes of 
this sort are compared with local control schemes such as AVC, in the case of OLTC-
equipped substations, and an automatic voltage regulator (AVR) in the case of DG. 
Further schemes have been proposed whereby optimal, collective control of DG is 
based on distributed measurements [51], [105], [112], [121]. 
 
Multi-agent systems, under which multiple, intelligent agents, located within, for 
example, PV inverter controllers, communicate and cooperate in order to reach optimal 
decisions for distribution network control have also been proposed [88], [150]–[153]. 
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2.5.2 - The architecture of schemes that have been deployed 
 
In [154], Lu et al. present a control architecture under which LV network data from 
smart meters in customer premises and power quality (PQ) meters in street cabinets is 
communicated to a substation automation unit (SAU) at a secondary substation via 
DLMS/COSEM over OPERA broadband over power line (BPL) [155]. This was 
demonstrated under the INTEGRIS project [156]. The architecture of the project trial, 
conducted on part of a distribution network of A2A Reti Elettriche SpA (A2A), located in 
Brescia, Northern Italy, is illustrated in Figure 2.34 [154]. 
 
 
Figure 2.34: Internal components of SAU (in A2A field trial) [154] 
 
Under this INTEGRIS trial, data was conveyed between secondary substations, and to 
the control centre, by means of a combination of fibre optic, BPL, and WiFi interfaces, 
and using the IEC 61850 protocol. 
 
Under the LoVIA field trial [119], conducted by ENWL, LV network monitoring and 
control was achieved by means of metrology and communications units (MCUs) located 
at the mid and end points of LV feeders on the test network. These communicated with 
a remote terminal unit (RTU) located at the secondary substation by means of GPRS. 
DNP3 was used over a local interface between the RTU and the relay controlling the 
OLTC of the secondary substation transformer. This enabled local voltage control to be 
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effected by means of the OLTC, and based on measurements from the LV feeder. The 
architecture of the trial is illustrated in Figure 2.35 [119]. 
 
 
Figure 2.35: LoVIA project architecture [119] 
 
2.6 - Smart meter and AMI security 
 
2.6.1 - Conventional electricity meter security 
 
Historically, the most common illegal interaction with electricity metering equipment 
has been local, physical tampering for the purpose of electricity theft. This has 
typically involved electrical bypass of the meter, attempts to stop or slow the recording 
of energy consumption by means of magnetic or radio frequency (RF) interference, or 
interference with timing mechanisms in the case of multiple rate tariffs [157]–[159]. In 
2011 it was revealed that more than 120 000 of the 3.5 million prepayment meter 
customers had been affected by the purchase of counterfeit electricity top-ups [160]. It 
has been estimated that electricity theft in the UK costs consumers £440 million per 
year [161]. The consequence of meter bypassing, and covert tampering with the 
internal electronics of a conventional meter by means of a hole cut in the back of the 
enclosure, are both shown in Figure 2.36. These examples were both found by 
technicians visiting premises to replace conventional meters with SMs. 
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Figure 2.36: Left, conventional meter bypassing, and right, internal tampering 
(courtesy Mark Malins) 
 
2.6.2 - Electricity distribution as a target for attack 
 
Electricity distribution networks are an established target of terrorist activity. In 1996, 
six IRA members were each sentenced to 35 years imprisonment for plotting to target 
substations around London and South East England with explosive devices [162]. In 
2006, an Australian man was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment by the New South 
Wales Supreme Court for plotting to bomb the electricity network supplying Sydney 
[163]. In 2015, the Russian hacker group Sandworm attacked the substations of three 
utility companies in Ukraine. By gaining access to SCADA systems, they were able to 
open circuit breakers resulting in power loss to more than 225 000 customers [164], 
[165]. 
 
Electrical systems are also a key strategic target during conflict between nation states. 
For example, Operation Desert Storm, conducted during the Gulf War, saw 215 sorties 
launched against electricity supply targets in Iraq, reducing generation capacity to less 
than 300 MW, and transmission to less than a quarter of its capacity prior to the 
conflict [166]. The 2008 Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Economic and Security 
Review Commission asserted that: 
 
‘China is targeting U.S. government and commercial computers for espionage … 
Internet-connected networks operate the national electric grid and distribution systems 
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for fuel ... A successful attack on these Internet-connected networks could paralyze the 
United States.’ [167] 
 
Indeed, it may be the case that state-sponsored infiltration of the U.S. electricity 
transmission and distribution systems has already occurred [168]. 
 
In 2009 the Stuxnet worm was first detected. This malware exploits the use of default 
passwords and a Microsoft Windows Server service remote procedure call (RPC) 
handling remote code execution vulnerability, amongst others. It specifically targets 
Siemens S7 programmable logic controllers, with the United States and Israel 
suspected of authoring the worm to attack uranium enrichment facilities in Iran [169]–
[171]. 
 
An attack against electricity distribution infrastructure which resulted in widespread 
loss of supply for a period of 24 hours in, for example, the UK, has the potential to 
cause considerable harm to personal and social welfare. The UK Government’s National 
Risk Register Of Civil Emergencies [172] identifies the risk to other utilities, such as gas 
and other fuel distribution, water and sewerage, as well as to telecommunications and 
financial services, from a widespread loss of electricity supply. Regional risk 
assessments [173], [174] identify the primary impacts of such an event, including 
fatalities from, for example, hypothermia in the elderly and vulnerable as a result of 
inadequate heating, property fires resulting from the use of candles and open fires, 
disruption to transport, disruption to the food chain as a result of problems storing, 
transporting and cooking food, and increased crime. 
 
2.6.3 - Smart meters and AMI as targets for attack 
 
Advanced metering infrastructure (AMI), as an important component of the smart grid 
vision of future energy distribution networks, represents a significant target for attack, 
as well as presenting unique vulnerabilities. Examples of the groups who may be 
responsible for attacks on smart meters as part of AMI, their motivations, and tools, 
are presented in Table 2.2 [175]. 
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Table 2.2: AMI potential attackers, their motivation and the tools they use [175] 
Attacker Motivation Tool 
Customers Personal reasons Personal knowledge or assistance 
from criminals 
Criminals Financial, sabotage or 
terroristic 
Creating software and hardware to 
tamper with AMI 
Insiders Various Unethical use of the system’s trust, 
illegal use of their authority and 
knowledge 
Institutions Using private information for 
various reasons, denial of 
service 
Using expertise, authority, resources 
and vulnerabilities of system or its 
components 
 
In [175], counter-measures against the physical tampering attacks typically employed 
against conventional meters, when employed against smart meters, are presented. 
However, the advent of advanced meter reading (AMR) and AMI introduces the threat of 
attacks which exploit the requirement for communication of SMs with devices outside 
of customer premises. These are illustrated in Figure 2.37 [176]. 
 
 
Figure 2.37: Smart grid distribution and corresponding threats [176] 
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The principal attacks against AMI systems may be categorised as follows [26], [27]: 
 
• Theft of data: For example, the theft of customer consumption data, or encryption 
keys stored within a SM. 
 
• Theft of energy: Energy consumption is inaccurately reported, or falsely attributed. 
 
• Denial of Energy: Malicious use of the remote, electrical disconnect facility of many 
SMs. 
 
• Disruption of network control: For example, providing false measurements in the 
case that these are used for operational purposes, or generating rapidly fluctuating 
load conditions by cyclically operating the remote supply disconnection facility. 
 
These categories are considered in further detail in the following sections. 
 
2.6.3.1 - Theft of data 
 
The interception of data communicated by smart meters may allow an attacker to infer 
details of customer behaviour, for example domestic occupancy [177]–[180]. This was 
demonstrated in a presentation given by Carluccio and Brinkhaus on an attack on a 
domestic smart meter installation in Germany [181], [182]. Here, communication 
between the SM and the head-end of the meter operator was intercepted, and customer 
behaviour deduced from energy consumption profiles. False consumption data was 
also successfully issued to the energy supplier. 
 
The impersonation of another customer or SM, using stolen data, has further 
implications for energy theft [183]–[185]. 
 
Data encryption is a key element of achieving confidentiality, by preventing 
eavesdropping and data tampering. Data integrity is further protected by 
authentication techniques, ranging from password authentication to digital 
certification [26], [183], [186]. 
 
2.6.3.2 - Theft of energy 
 
The mechanisms of electrical bypass of the meter tails employed against conventional 
meters apply equally to SMs. Furthermore, SMs present further vulnerabilities as a 
result of communication, hardware or firmware compromise, in order to misrepresent 
energy consumption. However, approaches have been presented to detect energy theft 
by means of identifying anomalies in energy consumption patterns. In [157], a machine 
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learning method is presented which identifies anomalies in the consumption profiles of 
customers on an individual level. In [187], such anomalies are identified considering 
the aggregated energy consumption of a number of customers. 
 
2.6.3.3 - Denial of energy 
 
SMs incorporating a remote supply disconnection facility as mandated in the UK [34], 
for example, present a vulnerability not present in conventional meters. An attack in 
which control was gained over this facility might result in the denial of energy to a 
large number of customers [26], [28], or destabilisation of the distribution, or even 
transmission networks, by imposing rapid changes in load across a wide area [188]. If 
compromised, the firmware of a meter may be modified or replaced in order to alter 
the behaviour of the meter or further infect other devices [28], [178], [183]. This also 
has implications for the theft of data and energy. 
 
2.6.3.4 - Disruption of network control 
 
If measurements from smart meters are used to inform distribution network control 
decisions, false data injection, for example in the case of a man-in-the-middle (MITM) 
attack, may lead to necessary control action not being taken, or unnecessary control 
action being taken [189]–[192]. In [188], simulation case studies undertaken by Wei 
and Wang illustrate the effect of data-centric attacks on both data exchanged between 
smart meters and a control centre, for operational purposes, and SCADA data used for 
circuit breaker control. These resulted in power quality issues and erroneous 
protection operation in the simulated distribution network. Schemes to detect and 
mitigate the effects of false data injection attacks have been proposed [190], [193]. 
However, Overman et al. [194] assert that whilst such systems must include measures 
to identify and prevent cyber security intrusion, they must also be designed to tolerate 
such attacks to some extent. 
 
2.6.4 - Vulnerabilities and constraints of smart meters and AMI 
 
The cyber security vulnerabilities of SMs, beyond those applicable to conventional 
meters, may be categorised as follows [26], [195]: 
 
• Insecure wide area network (WAN) interface: If not protected by, for example, well-
implemented encryption, communication between the SM and the head-end system 
may be intercepted, modified or falsely injected [183], [185]. 
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• Insecure local interface: For example, access might be gained to a local, optical 
interface intended for meter reading and configuration using authentication 
credentials or encryption keys captured by bus snooping [178]. 
 
• Bus attacks: Data conveyed between components within the SM may be captured, 
modified or falsely injected. Data captured might include authentication credentials 
or encryption keys. Data related to consumption might be modified or falsely 
injected, for the purpose of energy theft. Data related to the identity of the meter 
might be modified or falsely injected, for the purpose of impersonation [183]–[185]. 
 
• Power or clock glitching: Modulation of the power or clock signals internal to the SM 
may result in firmware not behaving as designed, for example skipping instructions 
in the course of authentication or encryption [183], [184]. 
 
• Poor implementation of cryptography: This might include the use of cyphers with 
known vulnerabilities, the use of short or predictable keys, or the use of low-entropy 
random number generation. It might also include vulnerability to replay attacks, 
under which encrypted data, for example authentication credentials, is captured and 
subsequently retransmitted in the course of an attack [183], [185]. 
 
• Firmware flaws: For example, vulnerability to buffer overflow or format string 
attacks, under which data is written to memory locations in a manner not intended 
by the firmware design, or an insufficiently robust mechanism for firmware update 
[183], [196]. 
 
• Key and password management: For example, keys and passwords stored in non-
volatile memory within components of the smart meters may be exposed by 
extracting the firmware from these devices, or captured during transmission 
between them. This may expose multiple SMs to attack if common keys or 
authentication credentials are used [28], [183], [197]. 
 
Constraints of SMs, pertinent to cyber security, include [198]: 
 
• Cost: Commercially deployed SMs are necessarily a mass-produced device and, as 
such, are cost-optimised. Accordingly, a compromise is made between cost and 
security. This might preclude, for example, the use of dedicated security hardware 
such as a cryptoprocessor [199]. 
 
• Technical limitations: In addition to being limited by cost, the technical capacity of 
SMs may be limited by physical, communications, and power dissipation 
requirements. For example, well-established Internet security protocols which might 
be applied to AMI systems, such as IPsec or SSL/TLS, or elliptic curve cryptography, 
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are not necessarily scalable for implementation on resource-constrained SMs [28], 
[200], [201]. 
 
• Type approval: SMs may require type approval and/or certification to be used for 
legal metrology, for example under The Meters (Certification) Regulations 1998 in 
the UK [202]. This may limit the scope for upgrade or modification of the devices, 
for example to patch a known security issue. 
 
• Location: The location of SMs, in customer premises, is an uncontrolled, insecure 
environment. Access to the meter, for example for the purpose of physical 
tampering, is unrestricted and unmonitored. 
 
In addition to those applicable to SMs, limiting factors pertinent to cyber security and 
applicable to AMI systems include [198]: 
 
• Limited communications: For example, low available bandwidth over low-power RF 
links such as power line carrier (PLC), or high contention for a mobile telephone 
network cell. This might preclude the use of security protocols imposing a large 
overhead, or the frequent exchange of certificates [203]. 
 
• Public communications: For example, the use of the public, cellular telephone 
network for communication. As well as limiting the scope for isolation of AMI traffic 
from other services, this might mandate the use of specific protocols, for example 
GPRS. 
 
• Data management: An AMI system hosting large numbers of SMs will need to 
process and store a large volume of data, as well as accommodating the 
cryptographic overhead associated with communication with them [197]. In addition, 
multiple, geographically disparate parties may require role-based access to AMI 
head-end data, for example energy retailers and DNOs. This requires management of 
what data is available to which parties, and how it is securely conveyed [183], [204]. 
 
2.6.5 - The security of existing smart meter and AMI schemes 
 
A survey by the 7th Framework Programme Meter-ON project [205] examined 15 smart 
meter deployment projects across ten European countries, totalling a projected 
deployment of approximately 100 million meters by 2020. In the case of five of these 
projects, it was found that no encryption of data between the meters, data 
concentrators and back-office systems was employed, and in the case of four of these 
projects no security event logging was performed. Furthermore, it has been suggested 
that the majority of cyber security breaches are not reported by organisations due to 
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reputational concerns [206]. However, valuable conclusions regarding cyber security 
have been drawn from SM deployments which have already taken place [207]. 
 
2.6.6 - Published smart meter and AMI attacks, and tools 
 
The extraction of symmetric AES-128 encryption keys from a commercially deployed 
SM was presented by Vidal and Illera [37], [38]. The keys, used to encrypt PLC 
communication by the device, were eavesdropped during transmission between 
processor and PLC devices at printed circuit board (PCB) level within the device, along 
with the unique identification number of the meter. If the same keys are used across 
multiple meters, then they may be used to gain illegitimate access to these devices 
[197]. Furthermore, access to the bus on which the unique identification number of the 
meter is communicated at PCB level may permit a man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack, 
under which a false identification number is introduced in order to impersonate 
another SM [195]. PCB-level access to a SM also presents the opportunity for other data 
manipulation and key extraction attacks [195], [208], though schemes have been 
proposed to address the issue of insecure key management, for example [196], [209]. 
 
In [36], Lawson presents an attack involving the extraction of firmware from the 
microcontroller of a smart water meter radio module. This is achieved by connection to 
the unprotected JTAG interface of the device. The defeat of rudimentary tamper 
protection is also described. This is shown in Figure 2.38 [36]. 
 
 
Figure 2.38: Attack on a smart water meter by connection to the unprotected JTAG 
interface of the microcontroller [36] 
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A practical demonstration of a denial-of-service (DoS) attack against two SMs is 
presented in [210], and in [211] a DoS attack involving multiple mesh-connected SMs is 
simulated. 
 
In [212], Davis presents a worm, an example of self-replicating malware, targeting 
mesh-connected SMs. In a simulated attack, this infected over 15 000 meters in under 
24 hours. 
 
In [213], communication between the local, optical interface of a commercially 
deployed SM and the vendor-specific management software is intercepted and used to 
determine the authentication token calculation algorithm. This was demonstrated to 
reduce the predicted time required for a brute-force password attack on the 
authentication protocol used by the optical interface of the SM of over four years, to 
under four hours. 
 
A framework for fuzzing, an attack technique whereby semi-random data is 
transmitted to a target in order to expose insecure behaviour or instabilities, designed 
to exploit SMs using the DLMS/COSEM protocol, is presented in [214]. 
 
A framework and toolkit for exploiting vulnerabilities in Zigbee networks, widely used 
for home area network (HAN) communication [215], [216], is publicly available [217]. 
 
In [178], Mo et al. propose attack schemes targeting the local interface of a smart 
meter. These include data spoofing, under which false data is presented to a smart 
meter, a replay attack, under which legitimate traffic is recorded and then replayed to 
the meter, and a delay attack, under which traffic is intercepted and then provided to 
the meter ‘out of date’. An open source toolkit for penetration testing SMs using the 
C12.18 and C12.19 protocols over a local, optical interface, is publicly available [218]. 
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3 - Design and development of the smart 
meter test rig 
 
3.1 - Introduction 
 
The design, development and commissioning of a hardware-in-the-loop test rig, 
incorporating hardware smart meter test beds, the infrastructure required for WAN 
communication with the meters by means of GPRS and for SCADA communication, and 
a Real Time Digital Simulator (RTDS) simulating a section of distribution network, is 
described. The test rig was developed in order to examine the use of AMI as a 
component of a distribution network control, or smart grid scheme. 
 
Subsequent sections are structured as follows: 
 
• Section 3.2 outlines the logical design of a smart meter test bed platform, intended 
to be representative of smart meter designs which are currently seen, or which 
might conceivably be seen, in commercially deployed smart meters in the UK. The 
logical design of a test-rig architecture which employs these test beds as part of 
distribution network control, or smart grid scheme, is also presented. 
 
• Section 3.3 describes the development of the hardware and foundation firmware for 
the smart meter test bed platform, based in the logical architecture presented in 
Section 3.2.1. 
 
• Section 3.4 describes the development of the test rig, including configuration of the 
RTDS, and of the SCADA server and controller machines, and the software 
development of the GPRS server. The physical architecture of the test rig is also 
described, based on the logical architecture presented in Section 3.2.2. 
 
• Section 3.5 describes the design and execution of a commissioning test, conducted 
to verify the correct operation of all the hardware, firmware and software elements 
within the smart meter test rig. This test demonstrates a simple, real-time voltage 
control scheme, effected using a transformer equipped with a SCADA-controlled 
OLTC within a simulated network, and informed by voltage readings from one of the 
smart meter test beds. 
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• Section 3.6 discusses the work undertaken, in the context of existing research in 
this field, and summarises the advancements and contributions made. The 
limitations of the approach taken are also considered. 
 
• Section 3.7 summarises and concludes the work presented in this chapter. 
 
3.2 - Smart meter test bed platform and test rig 
design 
 
3.2.1 - Smart meter test bed platform 
 
The design of the smart meter test bed platform was intended to be representative of 
smart meter designs which are presently seen, or which might conceivably be seen, in 
commercially deployed smart meters in the UK. Accordingly, a custom architecture was 
designed and implemented for the purpose of this research, which reflects constraints 
specific to domestic and light commercial smart meters such as cost, physical size and 
power consumption. The design is also such that a wide range of supply monitoring, 
data processing, and communications configurations may be applied. The logical 
architecture of the smart meter test bed platform is illustrated in Figure 3.1. 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Logical architecture of the smart meter test bed platform 
 
The choice of elements included, and the logical architecture of the smart meter test 
bed platform, was informed by existing, commercially deployed smart meters, and by 
the first version of the UK Smart Metering Equipment Technical Specifications (SMETS 
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1) [219], published by the former Department of Energy & Climate Change. A number 
of further elements may be found in commercially deployed meters, and specified in 
SMETS 1, for example a contactor for remote supply disconnection, an output signal 
for the control of auxiliary load switches, and tamper detection hardware. However, 
these elements were not directly relevant to the research conducted using the smart 
meter test beds, nor will their absence affect this research, and hence were not 
included. 
 
The core of the meter architecture is a single processor. The need for numerous PCB-
level hardware interfaces, such as SPI and UART serial, as well as low power 
consumption and relatively modest computational power requirements, make a 
microcontroller the typical choice for commercially deployed meters. Microcontrollers 
also contain non-volatile memory and RAM, such that external memory may not be 
required for operation of the device, although in practice it will typically be required for 
the mass storage of data such as meter readings. The architecture presented in Figure 
3.1 includes non-volatile storage for this purpose. 
 
A two-channel analogue to digital converter is included for the acquisition of current 
and voltage values. 
 
Two radio frequency interfaces are included in the architecture presented in Figure 3.1: 
a home area network (HAN) interface and a wide area network (WAN) interface. The 
HAN interface was included for local communication with, for example, simulated 
controllable loads, for the purpose of DSM. The WAN interface was included for 
communication with a remote, head-end system, by means of a cellular telephone 
network connection. 
 
The architecture includes two interfaces for local user interaction with the meter test 
bed. These are a user interface, comprising an LCD display, feedback LEDs and user-
accessible switches, and an infrared communication interface. Both the user interface 
and infrared communication interface are included for the purpose of monitoring and 
debugging. 
 
3.2.2 - Test rig 
 
The architecture of the smart meter test rig is intended to represent the fundamental 
elements of a distribution network control or smart grid system incorporating AMI. Its 
design is informed by the architectures of systems examined in Section 2.4 and Section 
2.5. The WAN communication scheme is typical of that employed for smart metering in 
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the UK. As such, smart meter test beds individually establish concurrent connections 
with a server over the WAN. The closed-loop, logical architecture of the test rig is 
illustrated in Figure 3.2. 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Logical architecture of the smart meter test rig 
 
The simulated power network model is hosted on a Real Time Digital Simulator (RTDS), 
manufactured by RTDS Technologies. This hardware device performs electromagnetic 
transient simulation, with a minimum time-step of 50 µs. In addition, values from 
within the simulated model can be realised as analogue signals using DAC cards 
connected to the simulator, and SCADA data exchanged with appropriate devices 
within the simulated model over a LAN connection. By means of the DAC cards of the 
RTDS, the smart meter test beds are provided with analogue voltage signals 
representative of the instantaneous voltage and current at a specific point in the 
simulated network. By means of the SCADA interface of the RTDS, control directives 
may be issued to appropriate devices within the network via the SCADA server, for 
example an OLTC. 
 
The controller is the endpoint of data received from the smart meter test beds, via the 
WAN server. On the basis of this data, the controller issues directives to devices within 
the RTDS simulated power network model, such as OLTCs, via the SCADA server. 
 
The SCADA server acts as a master station, providing protocol conversion and data 
buffering. Translation from one SCADA protocol to another is required for 
communication between the RTDS and controller device. It also permits data to be 
received from the controller with non-deterministic timing, but buffers this data for 
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exchange with the SCADA interface of the RTDS at regular polling intervals, for 
example one-second. 
 
The WAN server manages concurrent connections with multiple smart meter test beds, 
including performing registration of the devices upon connection, maintaining current 
connections, and handling disconnection. The WAN server also issues instructions for 
administration, or from the controller, for example a request for voltage readings to be 
taken by all connected meters or a sub-set thereof, and buffers data received from 
connected meters for transmission to the controller, for example the results of voltage 
readings. 
 
3.3 - Smart meter test bed platform development 
 
3.3.1 - Hardware 
 
The hardware design of the smart meter test bed platform was designed and 
implemented for the purpose of this research, based on the logical architecture 
described in Section 3.2.1 and illustrated in Figure 3.1. Figure 3.3 illustrates the 
physical architecture of the smart meter test bed platform including the hardware 
elements, the interfaces between them, and which of these interfaces have hardware 
interrupts associated with them. These interrupts are used to trigger interrupt service 
routines and a return of the microcontroller from a dormant, low power state.  
 
In order to permit alternative communication or sample acquisition devices to be used 
with the core hardware of the meter, the design is physically separated into two PCBs: 
a motherboard and a daughterboard. Data and power buses are conveyed between the 
two boards by means of a header. 
 
The hardware of the processor, memory and supporting devices, the local interfaces, 
the WAN and HAN interfaces, and the ADC and associated filtering, are described in 
further detail in the following sections. 
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Figure 3.3: Physical architecture of the smart meter test bed platform 
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3.3.1.1 - Processor, memory and supporting devices 
 
The processor used in the design is an 8-bit, Atmel AVR XMEGA microcontroller. This 
device contains 128 kB of flash memory for program storage, 8 kB of flash memory for 
bootloader storage and 2 kB of EEPROM. It also contains 8 kB of internal SRAM. In 
addition to the internal RAM, external SDRAM was used in conjunction with a dedicated 
interface within the microcontroller which permits the memory address space used to 
address the internal RAM to be extended contiguously into the external RAM. 
 
The RAM used in the design is 3.3 V, synchronous, dynamic memory with a capacity of 
64 Mb, arranged as 4 x 4 x 4 Mb, and with a maximum clock speed of 133 MHz. 
 
The microcontroller includes four hardware SPI interfaces. These are allocated to the 
LCD controller, the real-time clock, non-volatile memory and the ADC. The clock 
prescaler stages within the microcontroller permit an independent serial clock (SCK) 
frequency to be assigned to each of the SPI interfaces of up to half of the system clock 
frequency. The microcontroller also includes four USARTs. Three of these are allocated 
to the infrared interface, WAN interface, HAN interface.  The microcontroller provides 
multiple levels of interrupt priority for the USART interfaces, if used asynchronously, in 
addition to those used for generic logic interrupts. 
 
A processor supervisor device, powered by the 3.3 V bus which also powers the 
microcontroller, is used to hold the microcontroller in a state of reset during power-on 
or in the event of the 3.3 V bus falling below a lower voltage limit. The supervisor will 
assert the reset signal of the microcontroller, a 3.3 V logic level, until the voltage of 
the bus has exceeded 2.93 V for a period of at least 200 ms. During operation, the 
supervisor will also re-assert the reset signal of the microcontroller if the voltage falls 
below the lower voltage limit of 2.93 V. 
 
An external, active, ceramic oscillator provides a 12.000 MHz system clock signal to 
the microcontroller with a stability of ±25 ppm at a temperature of 21°c. The oscillator 
is powered from the 3.3 V bus and has a 3.3 V logic level output. 
 
A 64 Mb, 3.3 V flash device is used to provide non-volatile storage. This device permits 
a maximum SPI clock frequency of 66 MHz and page sizes of 1024 or 1056 bytes. 
 
A real-time clock device, powered from the 3.3 V bus, is used with an external battery 
to maintain timekeeping when the meter test bed is not energised. This device has an 
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accuracy of ±2 ppm at RTP. In addition to a 3.3 V SPI interface for communication it 
provides a logic level interrupt signal to the microcontroller. 
 
3.3.1.2 - Local interfaces 
 
Four LEDs, two pushbuttons, a sounder and a graphic LCD are provided for direct 
interaction with the meter test beds by an operator. The LEDs are driven with low 
power bipolar transistors, with two controlled by general-purpose logic outputs of the 
microcontroller and one each controlled by the WAN and HAN modules. The sounder is 
also driven with a low power bipolar transistor controller by a general-purpose logic 
output of the microcontroller. The LEDs and sounder are powered from the 5.0 V bus. 
The two push buttons drive general-purpose logic inputs of the microcontroller. The 
inputs driven by the pushbuttons are also configured to be hardware interrupts. The 
LCD used is a 128 x 64-pixel device with an integrated controller, such that it can be 
driven by the microcontroller using a 3.3 V SPI interface. The LCD is powered from the 
3.3 V bus. An LED backlight for the display, powered from the 5.0 V bus, is driven with 
a bipolar transistor controlled by a general-purpose logic output of the microcontroller.  
 
The infrared interface is a bidirectional transceiver module which integrates an 
optoelectronic source, detector, buffer and switching devices. It is connected to the 
microcontroller with a 3.3 V UART interface and supports a maximum data rate of 
115 kb/s. The infrared module is powered from both the 3.3 V bus, supplying the 
detector and logic elements, and the 5.0 V bus, supplying the infrared source device. 
Since the USART interface of the microcontroller to which the infrared module is 
connected is configured asynchronously, a hardware interrupt is also associated with 
the receive register of the microcontroller USART interface. 
 
3.3.1.3 - WAN and HAN interfaces 
 
The WAN interface is an integrated GSM and Class 10 GPRS transceiver module 
manufactured by Telit, and which can operate at both 900 and 1800 MHz. The WAN 
transceiver has a typical sensitivity of -108 dBm at 900 MHz and -107 dBm at 
1800 MHz, and a transmission power of 22 dBm at 900 MHz and 30 dBm at 1800 MHz. 
 
The WAN transceiver is powered from a dedicated 3.8 V bus. Since the operating 
voltage of the logic interface of the WAN module is 2.8 V, level translation is required 
for communication with the 3.3 V microcontroller. This is achieved by means of an 
active bus translation device which, in addition to performing voltage level translation, 
includes Schmitt triggers which increase the slew rate of logic signal edges. The WAN 
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transceiver is connected to the microcontroller, via the bus translation stage, by means 
of a bidirectional UART interface which employs RTS/CTS hardware flow control. 
Hence, bus translation is performed upon four logic lines, with two in each direction 
between the transceiver and microcontroller. A fifth logic signal from the 
microcontroller is used to assert the reset signal of the WAN transceiver. This logic 
signal is used to drive a low-power bipolar transistor connected to the internally biased 
reset line of the WAN transceiver in open-collector configuration. In addition to the 
UART interface, two further logic signals are provided by the transceiver module. The 
first is an operating state signal which is used to drive one of the notification LEDs. 
The second is a logic signal indicating the stability of the power supply to the WAN 
transceiver. As the slew rate of this signal is not critical, discrete level translation is 
used to convert it to a 3.3 V logic signal for presentation to the microcontroller. 
 
Power, voltage, data and clock signals are conveyed directly from the transceiver 
module to a SIM card holder. The RF interface of the transceiver module is connected 
to a coaxial PCB antenna connector by means of a controlled impedance trace. 
 
The HAN interface is an integrated, 2.4 GHz transceiver module manufactured by 
MeshNetics, which conforms to the IEEE 802.15.4 specifications for physical interface 
and media access, and which supports higher communications layers prescribed by the 
Zigbee protocol by means of firmware. The HAN transceiver has a typical sensitivity of -
104 dBm and a transmission power of 20 dBm. It is powered from the 3.3 V bus and 
has 3.3 V logic interfaces enabling direct electrical connection between the UART 
interface of the transceiver and the USART interface of the microcontroller. In addition 
to the bidirectional UART interface, RTS/CTS hardware flow control is employed. A 
logic signal from the microcontroller is assigned to assert the reset line of the HAN 
transceiver. Since this line may also be driven by a programmer or debugger connected 
to the JTAG interface of the transceiver module the logic signal for the microcontroller 
is connected via a transistor in open-collector configuration in order to prevent 
possible contention. Finally, a logic-level status signal is provided by the HAN 
transceiver which is used to drive one of the notification LEDs. 
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Figure 3.4: Smart meter test bed platform motherboard PCB design 
 
Figure 3.4 shows the design of the smart meter test bed platform motherboard PCB. 
Figure 3.5 shows this PCB after manufacture and assembly. The elements indicated in 
both of these figures are as follows: 
 
1: Sounder 
2: Infrared interface 
3: Notification LEDs 
4: Microcontroller 
5: Real-time clock 
6: Non-volatile flash memory 
7: LCD display 
8: JTAG programming interface 
9: Push buttons 
10: SIM card holder 
11: SDRAM 
12: Real-time clock battery 
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Figure 3.5: Assembled smart meter test bed motherboard 
 
3.3.1.4 - ADC and filtering 
 
The ADC employed is an Analog Devices ADE7753, a two-channel, 16-bit, second-
order, delta-sigma device with a maximum sampling frequency of 31.25 kHz given a 
maximum system clock frequency of 4.0 MHz. It integrates a programmable-gain 
amplifier (PGA) for both channels, a temperature sensor and signal processing stages 
which include RMS calculation. Both channels have a maximum input voltage of ±0.5 V. 
The functional block diagram of the ADC is illustrated in Figure 3.6 [220]. The ADC is 
configured with one channel performing acquisition of voltage samples and the other 
channel performing acquisition of current samples. Anti-aliasing filters are applied to 
the input signals of both ADC channels. These filters are first-order RC networks with 
both R and C elements socketed in order that the filter characteristic can be configured 
for the sampling rate used in a particular experiment. 
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Figure 3.6: ADC functional block diagram [220] 
 
The voltage channel signal path includes an attenuation network, preceding the anti-
aliasing filter. The attenuation network is a resistive potential divider which matches 
the peak voltage range of an input signal taken from the phase and neutral bus bars 
within the meter, when monitoring a 230 V single-phase supply, to the input range of 
the ADC. Both R elements in the attenuation network are socketed in order that the 
input range can be configured for a particular experiment. In order that a low voltage 
input signal within the input voltage range of the ADC can also be used, for example 
from a signal generator or real-time digital simulator, provision is made for this to be 
connected directly to the input of the anti-aliasing filter. The voltage channel input 
stages are illustrated in Figure 3.7. 
 
In order that a Manganin shunt resistor may be used as a current sensing transducer, 
the current channel signal path includes a phase correction filter, preceding the 
antialiasing filter. The phase correction filter is a first-order RC network which permits 
compensation for the phase shift in an input signal incurred from the parasitic 
inductance of a shunt resistor. Both R and C elements of this network are also 
socketed in order that they may be configured as required. As in the case of the 
voltage channel, provision is made that a low voltage signal within the range of the 
ADC input may be connected directly to the antialiasing filter. The current channel 
input stages are illustrated in Figure 3.8. 
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Figure 3.7: Voltage channel input stages 
 
 
Figure 3.8: Current channel input stages 
 
An integrated voltage reference is used to provide a 2.5 V reference to the ADC with an 
accuracy of ±1 mV and a maximum thermal drift of 3 ppm/°C. Since the operating 
voltage of the logic interfaces of the ADC is 5.0 V, level translation is required for 
communication with the 3.3 V microcontroller. This is achieved by means of an active 
bus translation device which, in addition to performing voltage level translation, 
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includes Schmitt triggers which increase the slew rate of logic signal edges. The ADC is 
connected to the microcontroller, via the bus translation stage, by means of a 
bidirectional SPI interface with a maximum clock rate of 10 MHz. Since this is a 
synchronous bus, an additional hardware interrupt line is also used. Hence, bus 
translation is performed upon five logic lines. These are clock, chip select and data 
from the microcontroller to the ADC, and data and interrupt from the ADC to the 
microcontroller. 
 
The main clock of the ADC is derived from a local 3.579 545 MHz crystal. 
 
The digital stages of the ADC are powered from the general 5.0 V bus, whilst the 
voltage reference device and analogue stages of the ADC are powered from an isolated 
5.0 V bus in order to reduce the acquisition of supply-borne noise.  
 
 
Figure 3.9: Smart meter test bed platform daughterboard PCB design 
 
Figure 3.9 shows the design of the smart meter test bed platform daughterboard PCB. 
Figure 3.10 shows this PCB after manufacture and assembly. The elements indicated in 
both of these figures are as follows: 
 
1: Zigbee interface 
2: JTAG programming interface 
3: GPRS interface 
4: Bus translation devices 
5: ADC 
6: Voltage reference source 
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Figure 3.10: Assembled smart meter test bed daughterboard 
 
3.3.1.5 – PCB design and assembly 
 
The motherboard and daughterboard of the test bed were designed using CadSoft’s 
EAGLE PCB EDA package. Both are 4-layer boards, with internal power and ground 
planes. In the case of the daughterboard, the ground plane is further divided into 
digital and analogue sections, with an isolated analogue ground plane beneath the 
input signal filters for both channels, the voltage reference device, and the ADC. This 
provides enhanced immunity from coupled and induced noise for the analogue 
components. 
 
The motherboards and daughterboards were fabricated, and the surface-mount 
components assembled, by Newbury Electronics Ltd. The through-hole components 
were then assembled onto the boards manually. The motherboard and daughterboard 
connect back-to-back, by means of PCB headers, and are mechanically joined by nylon 
screws and spacers. The outline of the motherboard, and display and switch positions, 
are such that it fits into a commercially available smart meter enclosure sourced from 
Cixi Feiling Appliance Corp. Ltd. 
 
3.3.2 - Firmware 
 
Foundation firmware was developed for the smart meter test beds in order to provide a 
platform upon which further firmware functions could be added, as required, for a 
particular experiment. The foundation firmware comprises: 
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1. Drivers for the internal components of the microcontroller, for example the SPI 
interfaces. 
 
2. Libraries for the hardware components of the meter which are external to the 
microcontroller, for example the ADC. 
 
3. Initialisation routines to enable and configure internal components of the 
microcontroller, for example the system clock. 
 
4. Initialisation routines to enable and configure the hardware components of the 
meter which are external to the microcontroller, for example the ADC 
 
5. Buffers for the microcontroller USART interface used for communication between 
the microcontroller and the WAN hardware module. 
 
6. Interrupt service routines for the microcontroller communications interfaces and 
other interrupt triggers, for example the microcontroller timer overflow. 
 
7. A routine for establishing a connection to the WAN server of the test rig using the 
WAN interface of the meter. 
 
8. A routine to perform the graceful shutdown of the HAN and WAN interfaces prior to 
de-energisation of the meter. 
 
The implementation of these elements is described below: 
 
1. C drivers supplied by the manufacturer of the microcontroller, Atmel, are used to 
control the low-level hardware elements of the microcontroller. The drivers used 
are: 
 
• CPU: Used to trigger a soft-reset of the microcontroller and provide reset cause 
reporting if a reset occurs that was not intentionally triggered. 
 
• PMIC: Used to configure and control the microcontroller Programmable Multilevel 
Interrupt Controller. 
 
• SLEEP: Used to configure and enter the low power sleep modes of the 
microcontroller. 
 
• SPI: Used to configure and operate the microcontroller SPI interfaces. 
 
• TC: Used to configure and operate the microcontroller Timer/Counter. 
 
• USART: Used to configure and operate the microcontroller USART interfaces. 
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In addition to the drivers, a software service module, CLOCK, supplied by Atmel and 
written in C, is used to simplify the configuration and control of the system clock.  
 
2. Libraries were written to provide a reference for the registers within hardware 
components of the meter, external to the microcontroller. Those included in the 
foundation firmware are: 
 
• ade77553.h This contains a reference of the register addresses of the ADC used 
in the meter. 
 
• st7565r.h This contains a reference of the internal registers of the LCD 
controller used in the meter. 
 
3. The file brazil_board.h assigns identifiers to the microcontroller communications 
interfaces used by hardware components of the meter external to the 
microcontroller. It also assigns identifiers to the hardware ports of the 
microcontroller at pin level. For example, the microcontroller SPI interface used for 
communication with the ADC is assigned a designator using the directive #define 
ADC_SPI &SPIF, whilst the microcontroller pin used as MOSI within the ADC SPI 
interface is assigned a designator using the directive #define ADC_MASTER_MOSI 
IOPORT_CREATE_PIN(PORTF,5). The file conf_board.h is used to define the 
configuration of the electronic hardware of the smart meter test beds. The 
components of the meter which are external to the microcontroller, and which are 
enabled as an option in the foundation firmware, are selected by #define directives 
within the file conf_board.h. These components are: 
 
• ADC 
 
• LCD display 
 
• GPRS interface 
 
For example, the ADC is enabled using the directive #define CONF_BOARD_ADC. 
The file init.c is used to define the parameters of a hardware component required 
to initialise it. If a component is enabled in conf_board.h, the function 
board_init within init.c, and called from the top-level function main.c, 
configures the microcontroller port pins by setting pin direction, initial logic level, 
and activating pull-up or pull-down resistors as required. The function board_init 
within init.c also configures the microcontroller port pins assigned to the push 
buttons, notification LEDs and sounder by default. 
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The system clock settings of the microcontroller are configured with #define 
directives within the file conf_clock.h. In this way, the system clock source can be 
defined and a prescaler applied, if required for a particular experiment. The 
foundation firmware defines the system clock source to be the internal 32 MHz RC 
oscillator of the microcontroller, with no scaling applied. 
 
4. The microcontroller SPI port assigned to the ADC, defined in brazil_board.h, is 
initialised as a bus master within the foundation firmware, with a clock frequency of 
1 MHz. It is further configured with a clock polarity of 0 and clock phase of 1, i.e. 
the clock signal generated by the microcontroller will have a quiescent state of logic 
low and data transfer governed by the clock signal will occur on the falling edge of 
the signal. The interrupt enable register within the ADC, IRQEN, is cleared by default 
within the foundation firmware and all other ADC registers are left in the default 
state. 
 
The microcontroller SPI port assigned to the LCD display, defined in 
brazil_board.h, is initialised as a bus master within the foundation firmware, with 
a clock frequency of 8 MHz. It is further configured with a clock polarity of 1 and 
clock phase of 0, i.e. the clock signal generated by the microcontroller will have a 
quiescent state of logic high and data transfer governed by the clock signal will 
occur on the rising edge of the clock. Following initialisation of the SPI interface 
which drives it, a sequence of configuration commands is sent to the LCD display. 
These commands initialize the boost converter within the display, and configure 
settings such as contrast, and on which line the first pixel to be addressed resides. 
 
The microcontroller USART port assigned to the GPRS module, defined in 
brazil_board.h, is initialized as an asynchronous interface with a bit rate of 
9600 b/s, a word size of 8 bits, 1 stop bit and no parity check bit. Following 
initialization of the USART interface, a sequence of configuration commands, in the 
Hayes/AT format, is sent to the GPRS module. These commands perform the 
following functions: 
 
i. Set the AT command echoing policy 
 
ii. Set the flow control policy of the UART interface used to communicate with the 
microcontroller of the smart meter 
 
iii. Define a packet data protocol (PDP) context for subsequent GPRS connection. 
 
iv. Configure the socket to be used for subsequent connection, specifying packet 
size, socket inactivity timeout, connection timeout (the maximum period to wait 
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for the acceptance of a connection before raising an error), and data sending 
timeout (the maximum period to wait before transmitting the contents of the 
transmit buffer, even if the number of bytes to send is less than the defined 
packet size). 
 
v. Activate the PDP context defined by function 3. 
 
The parameters set by these commands in the foundation firmware are given in 
Table 3.1. 
 
Table 3.1: Foundation firmware GPRS settings 
AT command echoing: Disabled 
Flow control: Hardware, mono-directional (CTS only) 
PDP type: IP 
PDP header compression: Disabled 
PDP data compression: Disabled 
TCP/UDP packet size: 300 B 
Socket inactivity timeout: 90 s 
Socket connection timeout: 600 s 
Socket sending timeout: 50 s 
 
5. Two dynamically allocated, 1 kB arrays are created in the foundation firmware to 
buffer data received from, and awaiting transmission to, the GPRS module. These 
arrays are operated as circular buffers. Functions to instantiate the buffer structure 
and to perform operations on the buffer, such as adding or removing elements, are 
defined within the file ring_buffer.h. 
 
6. Generic, prototype interrupt service routines were implemented to handle data flow 
between any of the USART interfaces of the microcontroller, when used 
asynchronously, and circular buffers allocated to a hardware module external to the 
microcontroller, for example the GPRS module. Separate interrupt service routines 
were implemented to handle data awaiting transmission from, and data which has 
been received to, the microcontroller. Flow diagrams describing the operation of 
both the transmit and receive buffers are illustrated in Figure 3.11. 
 
Upon reception of data by a USART interface of the microcontroller the USART RX 
interrupt is triggered, and an instance of the USART RX interrupt service routine 
copies the received data to the circular input buffer associated with the USART 
interface upon which data has been received. The USART RX interrupt is then 
cleared. When the hardware transmission buffer of a USART interface of the 
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Figure 3.11: Generic USART interrupt service routines 
 
microcontroller becomes empty the USART TX interrupt is triggered and an instance 
of the USART TX interrupt service routine copies data from the circular output buffer 
associated with the USART interface to which data is being sent, to the hardware 
transmission buffer. The USART TX interrupt is then cleared. If the circular output 
buffer is found to be empty when the USART TX interrupt is triggered, then this 
interrupt is disabled. The interrupt is re-enabled as soon as data is added to the 
circular output buffer. 
 
Within the foundation firmware, the only hardware device external to the 
microcontroller which is enabled, and which is connected to the microcontroller 
with an asynchronous interface, is the GRPS module. Hence, a single instance of 
each of the USART RX and USART TX interrupt service routines are instantiated for 
this device. 
 
In addition to interrupt routines triggered by communications events, a generic, 
prototype interrupt service routine was implemented within the foundation firmware 
which can be augmented to handle events such as button presses and timer 
overflows. A flow diagram describing the operation of this prototype interrupt 
service routine is illustrated in Figure 3.12. 
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Figure 3.12: Generic, prototype interrupt service routine 
 
Within the foundation firmware, this prototype routine is instantiated and 
augmented in order to service interrupt requests by the system timer internal to the 
microcontroller. 
 
7. Following the successful configuration and initialisation of the GPRS module, 
including the creation and activation of a valid PDP context, the foundation firmware 
attempts to establish a TCP/IP connection with port 7048 of the GPRS server. The 
GPRS interface is left in a state such that further functions and communication may 
be performed, as required, for a particular experiment. 
 
8. A function was included within the foundation firmware which terminates an open 
TCP/IP connection if one exists, deactivates the associated, active PDP context,  and 
releases the bound socket. 
 
3.4 - Test rig development 
 
3.4.1 - Real Time Digital Simulator  
 
The Real Time Digital Simulator (RTDS) employed is a physically self-contained machine 
manufactured by RTDS Technologies, which contains interchangeable cards for the 
real-time simulation of electrical networks as well as peripheral functions such as 
supervision of the unit and SCADA communication. A Giga Transceiver Analogue 
Output (GTAO) card, manufactured by RTDS Technologies, is used in conjunction with 
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the Giga Processor (GPC) cards of the RTDS unit in order to provide analogue signals to 
the current and voltage inputs of the smart meters, as described in Section 3.3.1.4. 
The analogue outputs of the GTAO card are single-ended with a range of ±10 V. The 
values of current and voltage signals from metered points with the simulated network 
are therefore scaled in order to fall within this range before being presented to the 
GTAO interface. The output values are refreshed on each 50 µs time-step of the 
network simulation performed by the RTDS, yielding an effective signal bandwidth of 
10 kHz in accordance with the Nyquist–Shannon sampling theorem. 
 
A Giga Transceiver Network Interface (GTNET) card, manufactured by RTDS 
Technologies, is used in conjunction with the GPC cards in order to provide a SCADA 
interface over Ethernet between hardware external to the RTDS and devices in 
networks simulated within the RTDS, such as transformer tap changers. 
 
A Giga Transceiver Workstation Interface Card (GTWIF), manufactured by RTDS 
Technologies, is used in conjunction with the manufacturer’s proprietary software 
package, RSCAD. This permits the layout and compilation of simulated networks, the 
upload of compiled networks to the GPC cards, and the control of a simulation during 
execution. The software package runs on a physically separate x86-64 desktop 
computer running the 32-bit edition of Debian GNU/Linux. 
 
3.4.2 - SCADA server 
 
The SCADA Server is a physically separate machine which acts as a bridge between the 
Giga Transceiver Network Interface (GTNET) card of the RTDS unit and the system 
controller. The GTNET card supports DNP3 for SCADA communication as a slave device 
only, and hence a DNP3 master station is required in order to connect to, and 
exchange data with, the card. The role of DNP3 master station is fulfilled by the 
software package PeakHMI, produced by Everest Software. A table of data points is 
created within the PeakHMI software which represents values to be read from, or 
written to, the GTNET DNP3 slave. These data points are created as required for a 
particular experiment. However, examples include a binary value to be written to the 
GTNET card to set the state of a circuit breaker, or a floating-point value to be read 
from the GTNET card in order to obtain the output value of a current transformer when 
these devices are used in a power network simulated within the RTDS. The DNP3 
master station exchanges data between the table of data points and the DNP3 slave 
device once every second. 
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In addition to the DNP3 master station, the PeakHMI software package hosts an OPC 
server with access to the table of data points referred to by the DNP3 master station. 
The OPC server permits human-readable references to be assigned to points within the 
data table, and permits an OPC client connected to the server to request a list of the 
data points and to access them for reading, writing or both. 
 
The SCADA server is an x86-64 desktop computer running the 32-bit edition of 
Microsoft Windows 7. It also runs the 32-bit edition of version 2.6 of the ActiveState 
Python distribution.  
 
3.4.3 - GPRS server 
 
The GPRS server is a physically separate, internet-facing system running a software 
server written in Python which accepts connections from the smart meter test beds. 
The server employs multithreading in order to support concurrent connections from 
multiple smart meter test beds. It also performs basic handling of data streams to and 
from the meters to which further functions can be added, as required, for a particular 
experiment. 
 
The main process within the server instantiates a TCP/IP listening socket and binds it 
to port 7048. Upon receiving a connection request, the main process verifies that the 
maximum number of concurrent connections has not been exceeded and, if this is the 
case, accepts the connection. If the maximum number of concurrent connections has 
been reached, the request for a connection will be declined. Following the acceptance 
of a connection, the main process instantiates a new object of the class Meter, which 
stores the remote IP address and port of the connected meter as well as its serial 
number, a record of the current status of the meter, and a data structure to contain 
received data. The main server process adds the Meter object to the list of connected 
devices and instantiates a new handler thread to which it passes the Meter object. 
 
The meter handler thread allocated to a particular meter buffers the data stream 
received over the connection with the meter and reassembles the data frames 
contained within it. STX/ETX frame encapsulation is employed for data transmitted 
between the server and connected meter and, as such, the handler thread will discard 
any data received until the start of a frame is signalled by the reception of an STX 
character. The handler will then reassemble the frame, which may span multiple TCP/IP 
packets, until the end of the frame is signalled by reception of the ETX character. Data 
subsequent to an ETX character within a TCP/IP packet it not lost, but rather is parsed 
for further complete or partial data frames. A default limit of 1 kB is placed on the 
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received data frames and frames exceeding this will be considered as malformed and 
hence discarded. Occurrences of the frame encapsulation characters within the data 
conveyed by a frame are handled in the same manner as the point-to-point protocol 
(PPP), a variant of the ISO high-level data link control (HDLC) protocol. Under this 
scheme, the instance of the reserved character within the data is replaced by the 
escape character 0x7D, followed by the original character bitwise XORed with 0x20. 
 
In order to handle scheduled events, such as requests for readings to be transmitted to 
connected meters, the main process instantiates an event scheduler process with a 
default clock tick period of 1 s. To prevent connections with meters being closed 
unintentionally as a result of timeouts being triggered at any point along the length of 
the TCP/IP connection route, a default broadcast is made to all meters in the list of 
connected devices on every clock tick. 
 
Figure 3.13 illustrates the execution of the GPRS server. In this example, the main 
process first instantiates the event scheduler process. Connections from two meters 
are then accepted with a handler process being instantiated for each. One connection 
is then lost, whilst one persists beyond the period covered by the figure. The default 
poll, broadcast to all connected meters by the event scheduler, is also shown. 
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Figure 3.13: GPRS server core processes 
The GPRS server is an x86-64 desktop computer running the 64-bit edition of Debian 
GNU/Linux. It also runs the 64-bit edition of version 2.7 of Python for Linux. 
 
3.4.4 - Controller 
 
The controller is an x86-64 desktop computer running the 64-bit edition of Debian 
GNU/Linux. It also runs the 64-bit edition of version 2.7 of Python for Linux and 
version 1.2.0 of OpenOPC. Python control schemes are executed on the controller, as 
required, for a particular experiment. 
 
3.4.5 - Physical architecture 
 
The physical architecture of the smart meter test rig is based on the logical 
architecture described in Section 3.2.2 and illustrated in Figure 3.2, and is illustrated in 
Figure 3.14. The connections between the RTDS GTWIF card and the RTDS workstation, 
as well as between the RTDS GTNET card, SCADA server, GPRS server and controller, 
are 100 Mb/s Ethernet links using an unmanaged switch. Communication between the 
cards within the RTDS unit is by means of optical links. In the case of all interfaces 
shown in Figure 3.14, significant protocols are specified, with N/S denoting that a non-
standardised or application-specific protocol is used. 
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Figure 3.14: Physical architecture of the smart meter test rig 
 
For the purpose of further research using the test rig, four smart meter test beds were 
manufactured. The RTDS unit and these smart meter test beds are shown in Figure 
3.15. The mother and daughter boards of the meter are shown installed within 
enclosures, and powered from a laboratory power supply. The coaxial BNC leads 
conveying the voltage and current signals from the RTDS unit to the meters can also be 
seen. 
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Figure 3.15: RTDS unit and smart meter test beds 
 
3.5 - Commissioning 
 
In order to verify the correct operation of all the hardware, firmware and software 
elements within the smart meter test rig, a commissioning test was implemented. For 
the purpose of the test, only one of the four smart meter test beds was used. 
 
3.5.1 - Commissioning test design 
 
A simple, closed-loop test was designed to demonstrate the correct functioning of the 
test rig, based on the principle of voltage regulation by means of a transformer 
equipped with a SCADA-controlled OLTC. A single smart meter test bed was used to 
monitor the bus voltage of this transformer within a network simulated by the RTDS, 
using an analogue output. A controller script was written in Python which received 
voltage readings from the smart meter test bed via the GPRS server at one-second 
intervals and, if the readings violated preset limits, issued tap-change directives to the 
OLTC within the simulated network via the SCADA server. This was tested by manually 
triggering a step change in the supply voltage of the transformer within the simulated 
network. 
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3.5.2 - Simulated network 
 
A simple network was created in RSCAD, consisting of a nominal 11 kV supply, a 
500 kVA, 11 kV/415 V transformer, and a dynamic load for which real and reactive 
demand can be set during runtime. Circuit breakers were also included on both the 
primary and secondary sides of the transformer. The transformer incorporated a tap 
changer with positions from 0.80 p.u. to 1.25 p.u., with intervals of 0.05 p.u. The 
voltage of phase A, relative to neutral, was routed as an analogue output signal from 
the RTDS unit. This output was scaled by a ratio of 100:1, such that 500 V within the 
simulated network represented a full-scale output of 5 V from the RTDS unit. This 
output was provided as an input to the voltage channel of the smart meter test bed. A 
DNP3 SCADA slave station with three points was also created within the simulated 
network. These points were associated with the input registers ‘TapUp’ and ‘TapDown’, 
triggering the OLTC to tap up and down respectively, and the output register ‘TapPos’, 
returning the current tap position. The schematic of this network is shown in Figure 
3.16. 
 
 
Figure 3.16: Commissioning test network schematic 
 
In order to control the simulated network during the test, a runtime control screen was 
also created in RSCAD. This enabled the supply voltage of the transformer to be varied 
in the range 10.5 kV to 11.5 kV, and the real and reactive load on the transformer to 
be varied in the ranges 0–500 kW and 0–500 kVA respectively. It also enabled the 
circuit breakers within the network to be controlled, and the voltage at the metering 
point to be monitored. The runtime control screen is shown in Figure 3.17. 
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Figure 3.17: Commissioning test network runtime control 
 
3.5.3 - Voltage control script 
 
A simple voltage controller was written in Python. The voltage controller requests 
voltage readings at one-second intervals from the GPRS server, if a meter is connected. 
If a received voltage reading exceeds an upper limit of 235 V, or falls below a lower 
limit of 225 V, then the controller instantiates a ‘Tap Changer’ process, passing it the 
directive to tap up or down. The ‘Tap Changer’ process attempts to establish a 
connection with the OPC master station of the SCADA server as an OPC client and, if 
successful, issues a tap-up or tap-down directive, as appropriate, to the OPC master 
station. Upon reception by the OPC master station, the DNP3 master station of the 
SCADA server forwards the directive to the DNP3 slave station within the simulated 
network. After the tap-change directive has been issued, ‘TapPos’, as reported by the 
OPC master station via the DNP3 master station, is monitored. If ‘TapPos’ reflects the 
requested change then the ‘Tap Changer’ process returns the new tap position and 
terminates. If the tap position has not changed to reflect the request, or the process 
fails at any stage, the ‘Tap Changer’ process returns an error and terminates. Following 
the termination of a ‘Tap Changer’ process with success, the voltage controller will 
continue to monitor voltage readings and respond accordingly. Following the 
termination of a ‘Tap Changer’ process with an error, the voltage controller will 
instantiate another ‘Tap Changer’ process in order to attempt to effect the tap change. 
The ‘Voltage Controller’ and ‘Tap Changer’ processes are illustrated in Figure 3.18. 
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Figure 3.18: Voltage controller processes 
 
3.5.4 - Test setup 
 
The simulated network was compiled and executed on the RTDS with control of the 
simulation transferred to the runtime screen shown in Figure 3.17. A balanced load of 
100 kW was applied to the transformer in the simulated network with the transformer 
tap position at 1.0 p.u. This yielded a voltage of approximately 228 V between the 
metered points. The GPRS server and SCADA servers were then started. A single meter 
was energised, with its voltage channel input connected to the RTDS GTAO card output 
associated with metered points in the test network. Finally, the voltage controller script 
was executed. 
 
3.5.5 - Commissioning test results 
 
In the first test, the supply voltage was changed from a starting value of 11.0 kV to 
10.5 kV using the runtime control screen. The voltage controller responded to the 
metered voltage falling below the lower limit by instantiating a ‘Tap Changer’ process 
which, in turn, increased the tap position to 1.05 p.u. and returned the metered 
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voltage to within the prescribed limits. The metered voltage during this process is 
shown in Figure 3.19.  
 
 
Figure 3.19: Tap up following metered under-voltage 
 
In the second test, the supply voltage was changed from a starting value of 11.0 kV to 
11.5 kV using the runtime control screen. The voltage controller responded to the 
metered voltage exceeding the upper limit by instantiating a ‘Tap Changer’ process 
which, in turn, decreased the tap position to 0.95 p.u. and returned the metered 
voltage to within the prescribed limits. The metered voltage during this process is 
shown in Figure 3.20.  
 
 
Figure 3.20: Tap down following metered over-voltage 
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3.6 - Discussion 
 
The smart meter test rig developed permits analysis of the effectiveness of real-time 
voltage control informed by measurements taken by smart meters distributed across a 
radial distribution network, including the effect of real-world communications. 
 
AVC schemes based on maintaining a constant MV busbar voltage in the presence of a 
limited penetration of DG, including those incorporating LDC, have shown 
effectiveness in simulation studies [42], [46], [49], [103], [104]. However, without 
control informed by distributed measurements, low load current and even reverse 
power flow resulting from a high penetration of DG may limit the usefulness of such 
systems [105]–[109]. In [117] voltage measurements from two points in a distribution 
network simulated on an RTDS were used to inform an AVC in real time. However, the 
limited number of monitoring points was a constraint of the hardware employed in this 
study, and the effect of real-world communications delays in limiting the response time 
of the system was not considered. Four smart meter test beds have been manufactured 
for the purpose of this research, constraining monitoring to a maximum of four 
distributed monitoring locations, though practically the number of smart meters which 
may be hosted by the test rig is limited only by the number of RTDS analogue output 
channels (12 per GTAO card). 
 
In [93] the application of OLTCs to LV feeder control is examined, with constant set-
point, time based, and remote monitoring-based control schemes considered. This 
study demonstrated that the OLTC combined with remote measurements offered the 
greatest mitigation of the effect of voltage non-compliance caused by PV penetration, 
whilst minimising the number of tap changes. However, this study did not consider the 
real-world limitations of communicating measurements from smart meters to a 
controller. The remote monitoring scheme presented in [93] was deployed in the real-
world LoVIA field trial [119]. LV network monitoring was achieved by metrology and 
communications units (MCUs) distributed along the LV feeders on the test network. 
This limited the application of metrology to points on the distribution network 
providing exposed conductors to which monitoring equipment could be attached, for 
example in the substation and in street cabinets. As such, it was not possible in the 
trial of [119] to employ measurements at the point of common coupling (PCC), the 
connection point of the customer. As per equation (2.5), the feeder and supply cable 
between a given customer and the nearest monitoring point in this trial limited the 
accuracy to which the voltage at the customer’s premises could be established, the 
uncertainty increasing with distance. The test rig developed in this work allows 
measurements to be taken by means of the smart meters from any point in the 
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distribution network simulated on the RTDS, without limitations of access to 
connection points. The performance of the system described in [119] is further limited 
by the intrinsic minimum response time of the voltage monitoring ‘nodes’ employed 
for the study, which present measurements as one-minute averages. Similarly, in the 
DG DemoNet – Smart LV Grid project [113]–[116], field trials of an OLTC controller 
informed by commercial smart meters were conducted on three Austrian LV networks. 
However, measurement granularity was limited by the commercial meters to a 5-
minute moving-average value. The smart meter test beds developed in this work as 
part of the test rig may be configured such that voltage measurements are transmitted 
immediately, or averaged over an arbitrary number of samples or period of time, 
permitting the response of the system to be examined without limitations imposed by 
third-party hardware. The system employed for communication with the smart meters 
in the DG DemoNet – Smart LV Grid project was further limited by the fixed broadband 
over power line (BPL) communications protocol employed by the commercial meters, 
incurring a typical overhead of 1 s. The smart meter test beds developed in this work 
employ a cellular network interface, which reflects the preferred communications 
system for smart meter deployments in the UK, and permit the real-world 
communications and processing delays incurred in a real-time control system 
incorporating smart meters to be evaluated. These delays are non-deterministic 
factors, not adequately examined in existing studies. 
 
The principal limitations of the test rig developed in this work are those of the 
necessary simplification of the distribution network simulated by the RTDS, due to 
finite processing capacity, and the small population of meters manufactured. A 
simplified power network simulation cannot fully reflect chaotic behaviours of real-
world generation sources and loads, particularly at the level of LV where, at the 
periphery of the distribution network, the aggregated power figures based on 
diversified generation and demand are a weaker approximation of true power profiles. 
An advantage of the simulated distribution network, however, is that smart meters may 
always be preferentially allocated to network locations which are expected to 
experience the greatest voltage deviations, for example end points on radial feeders or 
long radial tees. In this way, the provision of smart meter measurements from all 
customers on a distribution network is not required, since a smaller population of 
meters may be allocated to such critical locations. However, a small population of 
smart meters does have the consequence of limiting the scope for examining the 
impact of communications congestion and processing overhead, if a smart metering 
head-end system is to support end-to-end communications with a large number of 
meters. 
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3.7 - Conclusion 
 
A smart meter test bed platform has been developed which permits the control of 
sample acquisition, processing and communication parameters. A Real Time Digital 
Simulator has been employed to simulate a section of distribution network, and to 
provide analogue output signals representative of values within a simulated network in 
real-time. A test rig has been assembled which integrates these components in the 
form of a closed-loop control system, whereby SCADA-controllable assets within the 
simulated network may be directed by a controller informed by readings acquired by 
the smart meter test beds. Finally, a simple voltage control application has been 
implemented using one of the smart meter test beds, which successfully demonstrated 
the correct operation of the test rig, for the purpose of commissioning. 
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4 - Distribution network voltage control 
using smart meters 
 
4.1 - Introduction 
 
The use of the smart meter test rig to demonstrate the implementation of real-time 
voltage control within an LV network is described. This employs the hardware, and 
builds on the foundation software and firmware, described in Chapter 3. 
 
Subsequent sections are structured as follows: 
 
• Section 4.2 describes the development of a simplified LV network model for 
execution on a Real Time Digital Simulator (RTDS), and based on an existing generic 
distribution network model. The model extends from an 11 kV source to four LV 
feeders. The network model includes a distribution transformer equipped with an 
on-load tap changer (OLTC), and generation and load blocks which are controllable 
in order to simulate variation in the magnitude of generation and demand at 
different points within the network. The network also contains metering points 
allowing signals from the simulated network to be routed to the smart meter test 
beds via the hardware digital to analogue converters of the RTDS. 
 
• Section 4.3 describes the implementation of a voltage alarm function to augment the 
foundation firmware of the smart meter test beds described in Chapter 3. This 
enables the smart meters to report, by exception, the detection of a measured 
voltage which violates prescribed limits. 
 
• Section 4.4 describes the implementation of an automatic voltage controller. This 
implements an algorithm to assess the present voltage conditions measured within 
the simulated network by the smart meters and estimates the future voltage 
conditions if a tap change is performed. Based on the outcome of this algorithm and 
the availability of tap positions, the voltage control process will determine if a tap 
change should be requested, conduct the tap-change process over SCADA if 
necessary, and assess the subsequent network voltage conditions. 
 
• Section 4.5 describes the configuration of instruments used in the experiment to 
demonstrate real-time voltage control, and of the telecommunications infrastructure 
employed. It also describes the test parameters used. 
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• Section 4.6 presents four test scenarios, illustrating the response of the voltage 
control system to voltage excursions on a simulated LV network exhibiting heavy 
loading and containing a high penetration of distributed generation. The four 
scenarios demonstrate the scope for voltage regulation using the on-load tap 
changer in the case of: 
 
1. Heavy loading, for example from a high penetration of electric vehicle charging. 
 
2. High levels of distributed generation, for example from a high penetration of 
solar PV installation. 
 
3. Heavy, imbalanced loading. 
 
4. The conflicting requirements of a combination of heavy loading and high levels of 
distributed generation. 
 
• Section 4.7 discusses the work undertaken, in the context of existing research in 
this field, and summarises the advancements and contributions made. The 
limitations of the approach taken are also considered. 
 
• Section 4.8 summarises and concludes the work presented in this chapter. 
 
4.2 - LV network model 
 
4.2.1 - Simulation topology 
 
The LV distribution network model developed was based on the generic, UK 
distribution network, presented by Ingram et al. [57]. For the purpose of this research, 
a single 11 kV/LV transformer was considered, fed by an 11 kV source. Circuit 
breakers are included in the model between the 11 kV source and the transformer, and 
between the transformer and the LV bus, as a means of switching the supply to the 
simulated network during the process of testing. Four feeders are modelled, diverging 
radially from the LV bus. Along each of these feeders a grouped load/source block is 
modelled at the centre and end of the feeder. These are separated from each other, 
and from the LV bus, by simulated cable sections. The topology of the network is 
illustrated in Figure 4.1. 
 
The network model was constructed in RTDS Technologies’ RSCAD software, and 
simulated with a time-step of 75 µs. The model permits two cases, each describing the 
load and generation power of the individual loads and sources within each load/source 
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block, to exist concurrently. By switching between these cases during runtime the 
response of the voltage control system to the effects of a change in power flow within 
the simulated network can be observed. 
 
 
Figure 4.1: LV distribution network topology 
 
4.2.2 - Network source and transformer configuration 
 
The 11 kV source was assigned a rating of 25 MVA. This was simulated using an 
infinite bus voltage source combined with a positive sequence impedance. In order to 
conserve simulation capacity, a purely resistive series impedance, R, was employed for 
each phase, and calculated as follows: 
 
 (4.1)
 
Where V is the line voltage, and P is the source rating. 
 
The transformer was further modelled as ideal, neglecting magnetising inductance and 
potential core saturation, with a rating of 500 kVA. It was assigned a Dy11 winding 
configuration with a leakage inductance of 0.05 p.u. and no-load losses of 0.001 p.u. 
The transformer is equipped with an OLTC, with a range of 87.5 % to 112.5 % in 
increments of 2.5 %, and assumed to be electronically-commutated. The tap changer 
has inputs which trigger tap changes up or down on the rising edge of a pulse and an 
output which return the current tap position. The source and transformer schematic 
from RSCAD are shown in Figure 4.2. 
4 - Distribution network voltage control using smart meters 
94 
 
Figure 4.2: Distribution network source and transformer 
 
4.2.3 - Cable modelling 
 
Two cable section models were used in the simulated network. The first, used between 
the LV bus and the first load/source block on each feeder, was modelled as 300 m 
length of 185mm2 CNE type cable with an impedance of 0.164 + j0.074 Ω/km for the 
phase conductors and 0.164 + j0.014 Ω/km for the neutral conductors, as per [57]. 
The cable section model was therefore constructed with a phase and neutral series 
resistance of 49.2x10-3 Ω and series inductance calculated as follows: 
 
Phase conductor: 
 
(4.2)
 
Neutral conductor: 
 
(4.3)
 
The second cable section, used between the first and second load/source block on 
each feeder, was modelled as a 300 m length of 95mm2 CNE type cable with a cable 
impedance is 0.32 + j0.075 Ω/km for the phase conductors and 0.32 + j0.016 Ω/km 
for the neutral conductors. The cable section model was therefore constructed with a 
phase and neutral series resistance of 96x10-3 Ω and series inductance calculated as 
follows: 
 
Phase conductor: 
 
(4.4)
 
  4 - Distribution network voltage control using smart meters 
 95  
Neutral conductor: 
 
(4.5)
 
The schematic of the cable section models is shown in Figure 4.3. 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Cable section models 
 
4.2.4 - Load/source block design 
 
The load/source blocks, modelled at the centre and end of each of the four LV feeders 
are comprised of single-phase dynamic load models, provided by RSCAD, and power 
injection subsystems developed for the purpose of this study. Both the load and source 
elements were connected phase-neutral. 
 
Each single-phase load and source within the load/source block was assigned three 
inputs. Two of these define set-points for real power flow, designated ‘A’ and ‘B’, and a 
third input, designated ‘SCENE’, selects which of ‘A’ and ‘B’ to assign as the current 
set-point. In this way, the set-points for two possible cases can be entered for all load 
and source elements in the network and a switch made between the two cases, 
affecting all load and source elements, controlled by the global variable ‘SCENE’. 
 
4.2.5 - Dynamic load module control 
 
The dynamic load modules are preceded by a selector which, based on the ‘SCENE’ 
input, defines which of inputs ‘A’ and ‘B’ are provided as the set-points to the module 
in the case of real and reactive power. The selectors controlling the real and reactive 
power set-points of the red phase load module in load/source block 1A are shown in 
Figure 4.4. 
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Figure 4.4: Load module set-point selectors 
 
4.2.6 - Power injection subsystem design and control 
 
Real power injection within the load/source blocks is achieved using a controlled 
voltages source connected to each feeder phase via series inductors, as shown in 
Figure 4.5. 
 
 
Figure 4.5: Power injection circuit 
 
The relationship between voltage, phase and reactance in this circuit is defined as 
follows: 
 
 
 
(4.6)
 
 (4.7)
 
Where V1 and δ1 are the voltage and phase of the controlled source, V2 and δ2 are the 
voltage and phase of the feeder, X is the series reactance, and P and Q are the real and 
reactive power flow. Rearranging these equations yields the expressions for real and 
reactive power transfer between voltage source and feeder: 
 
 
 
(4.8)
 
  4 - Distribution network voltage control using smart meters 
 97  
 
 
(4.9)
 
In order to control active power flow into the feeder, the phase of the controlled source 
relative to the feeder is increased, whilst the voltage of the controlled source is 
matched to that of the feeder. The phase angle can therefore be expressed as follows: 
 
 
 
(4.10)
 
Where δ is the phase of the controlled source with respect to the feeder, and V is the 
matched voltage of the controlled source and feeder. In this application, only active 
power flow is controlled, and the reactive power flow is not regulated. As in the case of 
the dynamic load modules, the power injection subsystems are also preceded by a 
selector which, based on the ‘SCENE’ input, defines which of input ‘A’ and ‘B’ are 
provided as the real power set-point to the subsystem. A source capacity of 100 kVA is 
used. Hence the reactance is obtained as follows: 
 
 
 
(4.11)
 
The RMS voltage of the feeder phase into which power is to be injected is calculated in 
the metering subsystem of the simulation and, hence, is available to reference in this 
subsystem. In order to synchronise the controlled source with the feeder, a zero-
crossing detector is used to monitor the voltage of the phase to which is in connected, 
relative to neutral, and trigger a ramp generator. A constant is included in the 
subsystem to compensate for the simulation time-step delay, ∆t, incurred as a result of 
signal exchange between processors used for power system and control simulation 
within the RTDS hardware. This is added to the phase of the controlled source. In the 
case of the subsystem described here, with a time-step of 75 µs, an average delay of 
1.5 time-steps is incurred. The compensation constant is therefore calculated as 
follows: 
 
  (4.12)
 
This compensation constant is added to the calculated value of δ and the output of the 
ramp generator, and sine of the total angle is calculated. The result of the sine 
calculation is then scaled to match the voltage of feeder, and the final value used to 
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control the voltage source. The complete power injection subsystem is shown in Figure 
4.6. 
 
 
Figure 4.6: Power injection subsystem 
 
The schematic of load/source block 1A is shown in Figure 4.7. 
 
 
Figure 4.7: Load/source block schematic 
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2.6 - LV network simulation control 
 
An RSCAD runtime environment was developed in order to control the simulated 
network during testing. The control interface for the 11 kV source and 11 kV/LV 
transformer is shown in Figure 4.8. This interface includes controls for the 11 kV 
source voltage and circuit breakers on the primary and secondary sides of the 
11 kV/LV transformer, monitoring of the OLTC tap position, and monitoring of the LV 
bus. It also includes a control for the global variable ‘SCENE’ which sets which of case 
‘A’ or ‘B’ is currently in use. 
 
 
Figure 4.8: Network source, transformer and scene control 
 
The control interface for load/source block 1A is shown in Figure 4.9. This interface 
includes controls for the active and reactive power of the dynamic load models, and 
the set-points of the active power injection subsystems. These controls are duplicated 
for cases ‘A’ and ‘B’, and the current case highlighted in red. The control interface also 
includes monitoring of the feeder voltage at the load/source block location and the 
delivered current of the active power injection subsystems. 
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Figure 4.9: Load/source block control 
 
4.3 - Development of the smart meter voltage 
alarm function 
 
In addition to the RMS voltage measurement function implemented in the foundation 
firmware of the smart meters and described in Chapter 3, a voltage alarm function was 
implemented in order that the smart meters could report, by exception, the detection 
of a measured voltage which violates prescribed limits. As with the RMS voltage 
measurement function, this function is executed upon reception of a command from 
the GPRS server, to which the smart meters are connected. Upon execution, the voltage 
alarm function is passed a reference to the SPI interface buffer created for the ADC, a 
reference to the interrupt register assigned to the ADC and a reference to the 
prescribed voltage limits stored within the non-volatile memory of the meter. The 
function first enables triggering of the ADC interrupt on the zero-crossing of the 
measured voltage signal. The voltage alarm function then buffers three RMS readings 
from the voltage channel RMS register within the ADC. These reads are synchronised to 
the zero-crossing of the measured voltage signal, and hence correspond to three half-
cycles. The three values are then averaged, and the result compared to the prescribed 
voltage limits. If the average value is within the prescribed voltage limits, the process 
repeats. If the average value violates the prescribed voltage limits, the ADC interrupt 
triggering on the zero-crossing of the measured voltage signal is disabled, the average 
value returned to the calling function, and the voltage alarm function terminated. The 
procedural flow of the voltage alarm process is illustrated in Figure 4.10. 
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Figure 4.10: Voltage alarm procedural flow 
 
4.4 - Development of the automatic voltage 
controller 
 
A voltage control process was implemented in Python to execute on the controller 
hardware of the test rig, herein referred to as the AVC or Automatic Voltage Controller, 
which fulfils the function of ‘controller’ within the test-rig, as described in Chapter 3. 
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This controller directs the operation of the smart meter test beds by means of the 
GPRS server, receives measurement from the smart meter test beds, and issues 
directives to the OLTC within the RTDS simulated power network model, via the SCADA 
server. The core algorithm used to determine what voltage control behaviour, if any, 
should be taken within this process is based on that proposed in [221] and [117]. As 
such, in the event of a voltage or voltages outside of the prescribed limits being 
detected, the algorithm first evaluates whether conflicting voltage issues exist. If this is 
the case, it is anticipated that the use of the tap changer to restore the voltage at one 
metered point to within the prescribed limit will increase the degree to which the 
voltage at one or more of the other metered points violates the opposing limit, and 
hence no further action is taken. If no conflicting voltage issues exist, the algorithm 
verifies whether the tap changer is already at the highest position, in the case of an 
under-voltage condition, or the lowest position, in the case of an over-voltage 
condition, in which cases no further action is taken. The algorithm then estimates 
whether a change in tap changer position would cause the voltage at other metered 
points in the network, currently with the prescribed voltage limits, to violate those 
limits. If this would be the case, then no remedial action is attempted. The estimated 
voltage at a given point following a tap change is taken as the product of the current 
voltage and the ratio of the prospective tap position to the current tap position. For 
example, given a current voltage at a meted point of 230.00 V, a prospective tap 
position of 95.0 % and a current tap position of 97.5 %, the resulting voltage would be 
estimated as follows: 
 
 
 
(4.13)
 
Finally, if it is estimated that a change in tap changer position would not cause the 
voltage at other metered points in the network, currently within the prescribed voltage 
limits, to violate those limits, then the algorithm will initiate a tap change. 
 
Upon instantiation, the AVC process is passed an array of references to the handler 
processes of all connected meters. It is also passed a reference to the socket allocated 
to the connection with the OPC SCADA server, references to objects containing the 
voltage limits, and the parameters and current position of the OLTC. If the algorithm 
determines that a tap change should not take place, then the process returns a failure 
and terminates. If the algorithm determines that a tap change should be executed then 
a tap-change directive is issued to the OPC SCADA server, the process returns a 
success and then terminates. The procedural flow of the AVC process is illustrated in 
Figure 4.11 and Figure 4.12. 
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Figure 4.11: AVC process procedural flow (continued in Figure 4.12) 
  4 - Distribution network voltage control using smart meters 
 105  
Fi
g
u
re
 4
.1
2
: 
A
V
C
 p
ro
ce
ss
 p
ro
ce
d
u
ra
l 
fl
o
w
 (
co
n
ti
n
u
ed
 f
ro
m
 F
ig
u
re
 4
.1
1
) 
4 - Distribution network voltage control using smart meters 
106 
In order to utilise the AVC process, the event scheduler, included in the foundation 
firmware, issues a command to all connected meters to enable voltage exception 
reporting by executing the voltage alarm function. Upon receiving an alert of a voltage 
limit violation from one of the connected meters, the event scheduler sends a 
command to all connected meters to disable voltage exception reporting, in order to 
prevent multiple further notifications. The event scheduler then requests a read from 
all connected meters in order to obtain a current snapshot of the voltages at all 
monitored points in the LV distribution network. Once these read requests have been 
fulfilled, the event scheduler instantiates the AVC process. Upon termination of the 
AVC process, the event scheduler requests a read from all connected meters in order 
to obtain a current snapshot of the voltages at all monitored points in the LV 
distribution network following AVC execution. Finally, in order to address further 
voltage limit violations, the event scheduler sends a command to all connected meters 
to enable voltage exception reporting. 
 
An example of the execution sequence of server processes in the case that two meters 
are utilised is illustrated in Figure 4.13. 
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Figure 4.13: Example execution sequence of server processes 
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4.5 - Experimental setup 
 
4.5.1 - Configuration of measuring equipment 
 
An 8 channel Yokogawa DLM4038 mixed signal oscilloscope was used to acquire 
synchronised measurements of both the voltage at the metered points within the 
simulated network and the execution of the server processes. In addition to the voltage 
signals taken directly from the metered points within the simulated network and 
presented on analogue output (GTAO) channels of the RTDS, the RMS values of these 
signals were also calculated within the RTDS simulation and presented on analogue 
output channels of the RTDS. This enabled direct recording of the RMS voltage values 
using the oscilloscope. In order to measure the timing of server events, a call was 
added to the server software to toggle bit 0 of the parallel port interface of the GPRS 
server machine on the following events: 
 
A - Voltage limit violation alert received (followed by command sent to all connected 
meters to disable voltage exception reporting). 
 
B - Acknowledgment of reset received from all meters (followed by voltage read 
command sent to all connected meters). 
 
C - Voltage read received from all meters (followed by instantiation of AVC process and 
execution of tap position change, as appropriate). 
 
D - Termination of AVC process (followed by voltage read command sent to all 
connected meters). 
 
E - Voltage read received from all meters. 
 
The parallel port pin assigned to bit 0 was connected to the oscilloscope via a pull-
down resistor. The arrangement of measurement connections is illustrated in Figure 
4.14. 
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Figure 4.14: Connection of measurement equipment 
 
4.5.2 - Telecommunications system 
 
The GPRS connections between the smart meters and the GPRS server were made using 
the Vodafone UK cellular telecommunications network. The base station used was 
operating in the 1800 MHz band at Vodafone site reference 31823 and had a 
maximum transmission power of 25.8 dBW. The base station antenna was mounted 
approximately 41 m above ground level. The smart meters were located in the 
basement of the East Building of the Department of Engineering at Cardiff University, 
approximately 2 m below ground level. The antennas used on the smart meters were 
vertically polarised, quad-band elements with a gain of +4 dBi. The average received 
signal strength recorded by the GPRS receivers within the smart meters was -55 dBm. 
The locations of the smart meters and the cellular base station are shown in Figure 
4.15 [222], indicated in red and green, respectively. 
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Figure 4.15: Locations of smart meters and cellular base station [222] 
 
Figure 4.16 [223] shows an aerial perspective view of the locations of the smart meters 
and the cellular base station, indicated in red and green, respectively. 
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Figure 4.16: Aerial perspective view of smart meter and cellular base station locations 
[223] 
 
4.5.3 - Test parameters 
 
The voltage limits within the smart meter firmware and server software were set to a 
lower limit of 216.2 V and an upper limit of 253.0 V. These represent 230 V -6 % and 
+10 % respectively, as per The Electricity Safety, Quality and Continuity Regulations 
2002 [39]. All voltage signal values provided to the smart meters were taken between 
phase and neutral in the simulated network. Each scenario was tested 50 times in 
order that statistical analysis of the timing of server events, and time taken to restore 
network voltages to within prescribed limits, could be performed. The experimental 
time window for capture of the results presented was between 16:58 and 20:31. 
 
4.6 - Test scenarios 
 
4.6.1 - Scenario 1: High demand 
 
Scenario 1 demonstrates the response of the voltage control system to demand from a 
high penetration of electric vehicle charging. Case A represents a base load of 
1.3 kW/customer, reflecting maximum nominal customer demand [57], distributed 
uniformly across phases and across the extent of the simulated network. Case B 
represents the addition of a 10 % penetration of 3.5 kW/customer electric vehicle 
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charging, reflecting the maximum typical domestic electric vehicle charging power 
[82], distributed uniformly across phases and across the extent of the simulated 
network. The loads at each of the grouped load/source blocks for cases A and B are 
shown in Figure 4.17. 
 
 
Figure 4.17: Scenario 1 load powers 
 
Two smart meter test beds were utilised in this scenario. They were both assigned 
connections to the red phase at the locations in the simulated network shown in Figure 
4.18. 
 
 
Figure 4.18: Scenario 1 meter locations 
 
The voltages of all phases at each of the grouped load/source blocks in cases A and B 
are shown in Figure 4.19. Since all elements in the modelled network are balanced, the 
phase voltages are equal. Voltages which violate the prescribed limits are highlighted. 
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Figure 4.19: Scenario 1 network voltages 
 
As a result of the additional loading added in case B, the voltage at grouped 
load/source blocks 1B fell below the lower voltage limit. The predicted voltages at the 
metered points as a result of an increase in tap changer position in response to the 
under-voltage condition, estimated by the AVC process, are shown in Table 4.1. 
 
Table 4.1: Scenario 1 measured and predicted voltages 
  Voltage (V) 
METER NUMBER: METER LOCATION: CASE B: PREDICTED: 
1 1A (RED PHASE) 223.69 229.58 
2 1B (RED PHASE) 211.7 217.27 
 
Since the predicted voltages indicated that the tap changer position could be increased 
without causing further voltage limit violations, the AVC executed an increase in tap 
changer position. The final resulting voltages are shown in Figure 4.19. 
 
The profiles of the voltages at the metered points in scenario 1, with respect to time, 
are shown in Figure 4.20. The voltage limit violation at grouped load/source block 1B, 
following the transition from case A to case B, occurs at 0.00 s. In addition, the mean, 
and lower and upper quartile times of server events A to E, as specified in Section 
4.5.1, are shown. 
 
The mean, and lower and upper quartile times to achieve restoration of the voltage at 
all metered points to within the prescribed voltage limits are shown in Table 4.2. 
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Table 4.2: Scenario 1 restoration times 
 L.Q. x̅ U.Q. 
Restoration time (s): 2.74 2.89 3.06 
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4.6.2 - Scenario 2: High levels of distributed generation 
 
Scenario 2 demonstrates the response of the voltage control system to high levels of 
distributed generation, from a high penetration of solar photovoltaic installations. Case 
A represents a load of 0.16 kW/customer, reflecting the minimum nominal customer 
demand [57], distributed uniformly across phases, and across the extent of the 
simulated network. Case B represents the addition of a 50 % penetration of 
1.1 kW/customer generation, reflecting the PV penetration threshold at which voltage 
violations occurred in the study of [57], distributed uniformly across phases, and 
across the extent of the simulated network. The load and generation at each of the 
grouped load/source blocks for cases A and B are shown in Figure 4.21. 
 
 
Figure 4.21: Scenario 2 load and generation powers 
 
Two smart meter test beds were utilised in this scenario. They were both assigned 
connections to the red phase at the locations in the simulated network shown in Figure 
4.22. 
 
 
Figure 4.22: Scenario 2 meter locations 
 
The voltages of all phases at each of the grouped load/source blocks in cases A and B 
are shown in Figure 4.23. Voltages which violate the prescribed limits are highlighted. 
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Figure 4.23: Scenario 2 network voltages 
 
As a result of the additional generation added in case B, the red phase voltage at 
grouped load/source blocks 1A and 1B exceeded the upper voltage limit. Despite 
being balanced by design, a small imbalance exists between the phase voltages as a 
result of the disparity between their fundamental relative phases and the discrete time-
step on which execution of the constituent elements of the source models used for 
power injection practically takes place within the RTDS. The predicted voltages at the 
metered points as a result of a decrease in tap changer position in response to the 
over-voltage condition, estimated by the AVC process, are shown in Table 4.3. 
 
Table 4.3: Scenario 2 measured and predicted voltages 
  Voltage (V) 
METER NUMBER: METER LOCATION: CASE B: PREDICTED: 
1 1A (RED PHASE) 253.57 247.07 
2 1B (RED PHASE) 255.86 249.30 
 
Since the predicted voltages indicated that the tap changer position could be 
decreased without causing further voltage limit violations, the AVC executed a 
decrease in tap changer position. The final resulting voltages are shown in Figure 4.23. 
 
The profiles of the voltages at the metered points in scenario 2, with respect to time, 
are shown in Figure 4.24. The voltage limit violations at grouped load/source blocks 
1A and 1B, following the transition from case A to case B, occur at 0.00 s. In addition, 
the mean, and lower and upper quartile times of server events A to E, as specified in 
Section 4.5.1, are shown. 
 
The mean, and lower and upper quartile times to achieve restoration of the voltage at 
all metered points to within the prescribed voltage limits are shown in Table 4.4. 
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Table 4.4: Scenario 2 restoration times 
 L.Q. x̅ U.Q. 
Restoration time (s): 2.01 2.20 2.27 
 
  4 - Distribution network voltage control using smart meters 
 119  
Fi
g
u
re
 4
.2
4
: 
Sc
en
ar
io
 2
 v
o
lt
ag
e 
p
ro
fi
le
s 
an
d
 s
er
ve
r 
ev
en
ts
 
4 - Distribution network voltage control using smart meters 
120 
4.6.3 - Scenario 3: Heavy, imbalanced loading 
 
Scenario 3 demonstrates the response of the voltage control system to heavy loading 
from a high penetration of electric vehicle charging which is not distributed evenly 
across phases. This is based on Scenario 1. Case A represents a load of 
1.3 kW/customer, distributed uniformly across phases, and across the extent of the 
simulated network. Case B represents the addition of a 5 % penetration of 
3.5 kW/customer electric vehicle charging, distributed across the red, yellow and blue 
phases with a ratio of 2:2:1, within all load/source blocks. The loads at each of the 
grouped load/source blocks for cases A and B are shown in Figure 4.25. 
 
 
Figure 4.25: Scenario 3 load and generation powers 
 
Three smart meter test beds were utilised in this scenario. They were assigned 
connections to the red, yellow and blue phases, respectively, at the location in the 
simulated network shown in Figure 4.26. 
 
 
Figure 4.26: Scenario 3 meter locations 
 
The voltages of all phases at each of the grouped load/source blocks in cases A and B 
are shown in Figure 4.27. Voltages which violate the prescribed limits are highlighted. 
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Figure 4.27: Scenario 3 network voltages 
 
As a result of the additional loading added in case B, the voltages of the red and yellow 
phases at grouped load/source block 1B fell below the lower voltage limit. The 
predicted voltages at the metered points as a result of an increase in tap changer 
position in response to the under-voltage condition, estimated by the AVC process, are 
shown in Table 4.5. 
 
Table 4.5: Scenario 3 measured and predicted voltages 
  Voltage (V) 
METER NUMBER: METER LOCATION: CASE B: PREDICTED: 
1 1B (RED PHASE) 214.18 219.82 
2 1B (YEL PHASE) 213.88 219.51 
3 1B (BLU PHASE) 218.99 224.75 
 
Since the predicted voltages indicated that the tap changer position could be increased 
without causing further voltage limit violations, the AVC executed an increase in tap 
changer position. The final resulting voltages are shown in Figure 4.27. 
 
The voltage imbalance caused by the additional imbalanced loading may be expressed 
as a percentage figure approximated by the phase voltage unbalance rate, presented in 
equation (2.7). The voltage imbalances at locations 1A and 1B as a result of the 
additional imbalanced loading are as follows: 
 
Location 1A: 
 
(4.14)
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Location 1B: (4.15)
 
The voltage imbalances at locations 1A and 1B following the tap change operation 
directed by the AVC are as follows: 
 
Location 1A: 
 
(4.16)
 
Location 1B: (4.17)
 
The increase in tap changer position resulted in a reduction in the degree of voltage 
imbalance, in addition to restoring all voltages to within limits, and the final imbalance 
is within the limits of EN 50160 [59] and the short-term limit of Engineering 
Recommendation P29 [71]. However, the final imbalance still slightly exceeds the 1.3 % 
long-term limit of Engineering Recommendation P29. 
 
The profiles of the voltages at the metered points in scenario 3, with respect to time 
are shown in Figure 4.28. The voltage limit violation at grouped load/source block 1B 
following the transition from case A to case B, occurs at 0.00 s. In addition, the mean, 
and lower and upper quartile times of server events A to E, as specified in Section 
4.5.1, are shown. 
 
The mean, and lower and upper quartile times to achieve restoration of the voltage at 
all metered points to within the prescribed voltage limits are shown in Table 4.6. 
 
Table 4.6: Scenario 3 restoration times 
 L.Q. x̅ U.Q. 
Restoration time (s): 2.75 2.90 3.10 
 
  4 - Distribution network voltage control using smart meters 
 123  
Fi
g
u
re
 4
.2
8
: 
Sc
en
ar
io
 3
 v
o
lt
ag
e 
p
ro
fi
le
s 
an
d
 s
er
ve
r 
ev
en
ts
  
4 - Distribution network voltage control using smart meters 
124 
4.6.4 - Scenario 4: Heavy loading and high levels of distributed 
generation 
 
Scenario 4 demonstrates the response of the voltage control system to the conflicting 
requirements of a combination of heavy loading from a high penetration of electric 
vehicle charging, and high levels of distributed generation from a high penetration of 
solar photovoltaic installations, on adjacent feeders. This is based on scenarios 1 and 
2. Case A represents a load of 1.3 kW/customer, distributed uniformly across phases 
within all load/source blocks on feeders 1 and 2, a load of 0.16 kW/customer 
distributed uniformly across phases within all load/source blocks on feeders 3 and 4, 
and a 75 % penetration of 1.1 kW/customer generation distributed uniformly across 
phases within all load/source blocks on feeders 3 and 4. Case B represents the 
addition of a 15 % penetration of 3.5 kW/customer electric vehicle charging, 
distributed uniformly across phases within all load/source blocks on feeders 3 and 4. 
The loads at each of the grouped load/source blocks for cases A and B are shown in 
Figure 4.29. 
 
 
Figure 4.29: Scenario 4 load and generation powers 
 
Four smart meters were utilised in this scenario. They were assigned connections to 
the red phase at the locations in the simulated network shown in Figure 4.30. 
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Figure 4.30: Scenario 4 meter locations 
 
The voltages of all phases at each of the grouped load/source blocks in cases A and B 
are shown in Figure 4.31. Voltages which violate the prescribed limits are highlighted. 
 
 
Figure 4.31: Scenario 4 network voltages 
 
As a result of the additional loading added to feeders 1 and 2 in case B, the voltages at 
grouped load/source block 1B fell below the lower voltage limit. Despite being 
balanced by design, a small imbalance exists between the phase voltages as a result of 
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the disparity between their fundamental relative phases and the discrete time-step on 
which execution of the constituent elements of the source models used for power 
injection practically takes place within the RTDS. The predicted voltages at the metered 
points as a result of an increase in tap changer position in response to the under-
voltage condition, estimated by the AVC process, are shown in Table 4.7. 
 
Table 4.7: Scenario 4 measured and predicted voltages 
  Voltage (V) 
METER NUMBER: METER LOCATION: CASE B: PREDICTED: 
1 1A (RED PHASE) 227.45 233.44 
2 1B (RED PHASE) 214.35 219.99 
3 4A (RED PHASE) 244.90 251.34 
4 4B (RED PHASE) 249.00 255.55 
 
Since the predicted voltages indicated that an increase in the tap changer position 
would result in further voltage limit violations, the AVC did not execute any change to 
tap changer position. 
 
The profiles of the voltages at the metered points in scenario 1, with respect to time, 
are shown in Figure 4.32. The voltage limit violation at grouped load/source block 1B, 
following the transition from case A to case B, occurs at 0.00 s. In addition, the mean, 
and lower and upper quartile times of server events A to C, as specified in Section 
4.5.1, are shown. 
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4.7 - Discussion 
 
Previous work incorporating real-world smart meter measurements has been subject to 
the limitations of data available from existing smart meters. For example, the 
European FP7 project IDE4L [58] demonstrated the effectiveness of distributed LV 
network monitoring by smart meters as a means of detecting the voltage rise at the 
customer connection point resulting from real power injection by a local PV 
installation. However, the measurements from these meters were only available with an 
update rate of one minute, and the data acquired was not used to inform network 
control. This work extends such schemes by implementing closed-loop control based 
on the smart meter measurements acquired. By development of a custom smart meter 
test bed platform, it has been possible to immediately acquire measurement data from 
the smart meters used, and to implement the custom voltage alarm function whereby 
the meters report voltage limit violations by exception in order that immediate control 
decisions are made. Similarly, in the LoVIA field trial [119], the one-minute average 
measurements received by the control algorithm were a constraint of the hardware 
used, with the further limitation that it was not possible to take these measurement 
directly at the customers point of common coupling (PCC). This work has addressed 
these limitations by demonstrating that real-time monitoring by smart meters at critical 
points in a distribution network, and connected via end-to-end communication links 
with a substation controller, may be effectively used to inform control of an OLTC in 
order to rapidly address voltage limit violations. This work further addresses the 
limitations of hardware-in-the-loop investigations such as [117], by demonstrating that 
a control system may be applied to a LV network incorporating an OLTC within an 
RTDS simulation, enhanced by the additional insight of the effect of real-world non-
deterministic communications channels. 
 
The maximum and minimum base demand figures used in the distribution network 
simulation used in this study are based on Electricity Association (EA) figures for after-
diversity maximum demand (ADMD) and minimum demand of UK residential 
customers (0.16 kVA and 1.3 kVA respectively) [57]. These are the current figures used 
to estimate domestic demand for the purpose of planning. The nominal electrical 
vehicle charging load of 3.5 kVA per customer is based on the typical maximum single-
phase domestic charging point rating of 16 A [82], with a 10 % penetration reflective of 
plug-in electric vehicles as a current proportion of UK car registrations [11]. The 50 % 
penetration of 1.1 kVA PV generation sources reflects the 40–50 % PV penetration 
thresholds at which voltage violations occurred in the study of [57], the generic LV 
network presented in which forms the basis for the simplified network simulated in 
this work. This is supported by the findings of [58], in which the high PV penetration 
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area exhibited PV generation of up to approximately 40 % of peak demand, without 
exhibiting voltage issues caused by power injection. 
 
The aggregated load and source blocks employed within the simulated distribution 
network in this study are both a useful simplification of the system being examined, 
and a necessary compromise to accommodate the finite computational capacity of the 
RTDS unit. Though it is possible that such aggregated block might conceal localised 
behaviour in a real network, for example local reverse power flow and consequent 
voltage limit violations, which would otherwise go undetected, they are sufficient to 
represent the feeders examined in this study, with smart meter measurements taken at 
the nodes of these blocks, and passive cable sections between. The study might be 
extended to examine the application of the control system developed to a real-world 
distribution network, or section thereof. In this case, it would likely be necessary either 
to increase to which an aggregated representation is used in some areas of the 
network in order to add detail to other areas, or to augment the computational 
capacity of the RTDS unit. 
 
The experimental results presented in this chapter were acquired in a time window of 
approximately 3.5 hours. Network latency, typically evaluated by round-trip time (RTT) 
impacts both throughput and response time in TCP/IP communications. Factors which 
strongly contribute to temporal variability in GPRS RTT include mobility (handover from 
one network cell to another), voice call pre-emption (priority allocation of data time-
slots to voice traffic), self-congestion (delay caused by a GPRS terminal device 
sustaining multiple concurrent TCP connections), network congestion (high levels of 
traffic from other GPRS terminal devices) and radio conditions (for example RF 
interference, necessitating data retransmission) [224]. Of these, the factors of mobility, 
voice call pre-emption and self-congestion are not applicable to smart meters, and the 
factor of radio conditions is assumed to have no strong correlation with time-of-day or 
day-of-week in the UHF band, for a given location. Network traffic and congestion is 
strongly linked to time-of-day, though weekend variations in network load do not 
significantly affect latency [225]. However, only a weak correlation exists between RTT 
distribution and network traffic load, as illustrated by the empirical Complementary 
Cumulative Distribution Function (CCDF) of RTT for GPRS in four 6 h period, shown in 
Figure 4.33 [226]. As such, experimental results taken within a time window of less 
than 24-hours are presented as representative of continuous operation at the test site. 
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Figure 4.33: Empirical CCDF of RTT for GPRS in four different 6h periods [226] 
 
The control system implemented in this work does not incorporate a mechanism for 
limiting the frequency of tap-change operations, nor for considering multiple 
prospective tap-change operations in making control decisions. Whilst the issue of a 
high frequency of tap-change operations is largely negated by the assumption that a 
deployed implementation of a system such as this would incorporate OLTCs with 
electronic commutation [95]–[100], the work presented might be extended by the 
inclusion of a means to limit tap-change frequency. Furthermore, the control algorithm 
might be augmented as described in [118], in order to anticipate the requirement for 
multiple tap change operations. Rather than assessing the effect of each tap-change 
operation in isolation, this would allow the algorithm to predict the effect of multiple 
successive tap changes and either perform these as a block operation, avoiding the 
communications and processing delay associated with multiple independent 
operations, or to elect not to perform any operation if the algorithm deemed that such 
an action would create a voltage limit violation issue elsewhere in the network. 
 
The issue of voltage limit violation as a result of heavy, imbalanced loading was shown 
to be resolved by the action of the control system in this work. However, whilst the 
degree of voltage imbalance was reduced as an additional effect of this action, the use 
of a conventional coupled OLTC, in which tap changes are applied to all phases 
simultaneously, limits the scope for resolution of phase imbalance by means of the 
OLTC alone. The control algorithm implemented might be extended to permit control 
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of a decoupled OLTC, as presented in [101] and [102], capable of changing the tap 
position of each phase independently. 
 
Whilst, in this study, it was shown that three of the four voltage violation issue 
scenarios demonstrated were adequately resolved by means of OLTC control alone, the 
control algorithm implemented might be extended to resolve local voltage violations 
which the controller was not able to resolve without causing further issues, for 
example in scenario 4. In [139], the use of local battery energy storage, in conjunction 
with a smart meter and OLTC, was demonstrated to be effective as a means of local 
voltage regulation in a simulated network. The study of [139] did not consider multiple 
concurrent voltage violation issues in a network, nor distributed voltage measurements 
by multiple smart meters, as have been examined in this work. However, the system 
presented in this chapter might be extended by the inclusion of energy storage as a 
further means of voltage control in this way, with the algorithm adapted to optimise 
the multiple objectives of voltage regulation, loss minimisation and longevity of the 
energy storage medium. This would increase the scope for the system presented to 
address local voltage issues in the context of the complete distribution network. 
Similarly, though the low X/R ratio of LV network may limit the scope for voltage 
regulation by means of reactive power control [123], simple local reactive control 
schemes have been shown to be of value in mitigating the voltage rise effect of LV-
connected PV inverters [124], [125]. The system presented in this chapter might be 
further extended to address local voltage issues in the presence of high penetrations 
of PV generation by augmenting such local control schemes with an element of 
centralised control, in order to optimise the voltage conditions across the network 
collectively, whilst considering the real-world limitations of communications between 
distributed devices. 
 
4.8 - Conclusion 
 
Implementation of real-time voltage control within an LV network using the smart 
meter test rig has been demonstrated. By means of a voltage alarm firmware 
component, added to the smart meter firmware system, and a voltage control process, 
added to the server software, voltages at metered points in the simulated distribution 
network which violate preset limits are detected, and an evaluation process initiated to 
determine if remedial action should be taken. In the case that it is determined that 
remedial action should be taken, by means of a change OLTC position, this is 
automatically executed. The average period between the voltage at a metered point 
violating preset limits, and the voltages at all metered points being restored to within 
prescribed values, in the cases that action was deemed appropriate, was 2.66 s. In the 
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case that the voltage controller implemented determined that a change in tap changer 
position could not be performed, or would result in further voltage limit violations, it 
was demonstrated that no remedial action was attempted. 
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5 - Smart meter and AMI security 
 
5.1 - Introduction 
 
Analysis of the cyber security vulnerabilities of a commercially deployed smart 
electricity meter, and of the connection of that meter to the head-end infrastructure of 
the meter operator, is described. Two attack methodologies are presented, informed 
by this analysis, and demonstrated to permit unauthorised electronic access to the 
meter. Finally, recommendations are made of measures to mitigate the vulnerabilities 
identified and exploited. 
 
The meter and infrastructure examined are the property of a smart meter installer and 
operator in the UK. This research was conducted on behalf of the meter operating 
company, and is presented herein on the condition of anonymity. Therefore, details 
which might identify the operating company or meter have been redacted, where 
necessary. The meter evaluated is the default choice for single-phase, domestic 
installations by the operating company, and typical of single-phase, domestic meters 
being deployed within the UK, at the time of writing. It is compliant with the first 
version of the UK Smart Metering Equipment Technical Specifications (SMETS 1) [219], 
published by the former Department of Energy & Climate Change. 
 
Subsequent sections are structured as follows: 
 
• Section 5.2 examines the technical information regarding the meter under 
examination available in the public domain, and the hardware elements of the device 
which represent vulnerabilities and hence the basis of potential attack vectors. It 
also describes preliminary testing of the local, optical interface of the meter, and the 
selection of attack methodologies. 
 
• Section 5.3 describes the toolkit developed to permit the exfiltration of data in 
transit between the metrological and computational core of the meter and the 
attached wide area network modem, and to communicate with the local, optical 
interface of the meter. 
 
• Section 5.4 Describes the processing and analysis of data captured using this tool 
kit, in order to expose vulnerabilities, and to extract security credentials and 
configuration information contained within it. It also describes the exploitation of a 
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vulnerability whereby extracted security credentials were used to demonstrate 
unauthorised access to the meter by means of the local, optical port. 
 
• Section 5.5 provides an analysis of the implications of the vulnerabilities exposed 
and attacks demonstrated. 
 
• Section 5.6 provides recommendations of revisions to the hardware and firmware of 
the meter, and to the protocols used for communication with the head-end of the 
meter operator, which may mitigate the vulnerabilities identified. These 
recommendations are made with reference to existing and established security 
protocols. 
 
• Section 5.7 summarises the research undertaken. 
 
5.2 - Vulnerability analysis 
 
5.2.1 - Prior information 
 
An Internet search for freely available literature was undertaken using the Google 
search engine, in order to determine what technical documentation regarding the 
meter under examination was in the public domain. Documents produced by the 
manufacturer, but distributed by third parties, were found describing: 
 
• Hardware: This included mechanical dimensions and mounting details of the meter, 
images showing the form and location of a tamper detection micro-switch designed 
to detect removal of the terminal cover, a description of the RS-232 and power 
interface to connect a GSM/GPRS WAN modem, and specification of the optical port 
as being FLAG (IEC 62056-21) and ANSI Type 2 (ANSI C12.18) compliant. It also 
included a description of the hardware user interface buttons and display. 
 
• Firmware: This included a list of the registers within the meter used for 
measurement, configuration and control, access to the bootloader, and direct access 
to the non-volatile memory of the meter. It also included the protocol and command 
structure for register read and write access via the modem interface and the optical 
port. 
 
• Software: This included usage information for the proprietary management software, 
produced by the meter manufacturer for use by meter operators. 
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5.2.2 - Analysis of hardware 
 
The physical architecture of the meter under test can be considered in two, distinct 
sections, as illustrated in Figure 5.1. The first of these sections is a sealed enclosure 
containing the metrological and computational core of the device. This enclosure is not 
designed to be accessed during the normal course of installation, configuration or use. 
The external interfaces for human interaction provided by the sealed section of the 
meter are two momentary push button switches, two visible indicator LEDs, and an 
LCD display. These interfaces, as described in the manufacturer’s documentation, 
permit the local observation of: 
 
• Metrology readings, such as accumulated energy, and instantaneous power. 
 
• The current status of the attached WAN modem, if present, the optical interface, the 
internal clock of the meter, and alarms warning of errors such as failure of the 
internal battery. 
 
• The serial number and Meter Point Administration Number (MPAN) 
 
The sealed section of the meter also includes an optical communication port which the 
manufacturer specifies as compliant to the FLAG (IEC 62056-21) [227] and ANSI Type 2 
(ANSI C12.18) [228] protocols. This port, as described in the meter manufacturer’s 
documentation, permits a command line session to be established with the meter. 
 
The second, serviceable section of the meter is intended to be accessed for the 
purposes of installation and maintenance. Brass receptacles for the termination of 
meter tails and an ANSI/TIA-1096-A 8P8C modular jack, for the connection of a WAN 
modem, emerge from the sealed section of the meter into this serviceable section. The 
WAN modem installed is manufactured by a third party. Documentation free available 
on the Internet from the manufacturer of this device specifies that the communications 
interface provided on the 8P8C jack is RS-232 compliant. The WAN modem also derives 
power from the meter through this connector, and hence is active only when the meter 
is energised. The serviceable enclosure of the meter is contained by a moulded plastic 
cover which is designed to be readily removable in the course of installation and 
maintenance operations. It is secured with a single screw, protected by a tamper 
evident tag, and carries a moulded protrusion which, when the cover is installed, 
activates a micro-switch. Removal of the cover results in the release of the micro-switch 
and, as such, is used as a means of detecting unauthorised physical access. The 
response of the meter in the case of this tamper detection device being triggered is 
specified in the manufacturer’s documentation as being to log the event, but not to 
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take further action, for example supply disconnection, by default. The design of the 
cover of the serviceable enclosure is also such that the tamper detection mechanism 
may be readily, mechanically defeated, for example by use of a shim to maintain 
pressure on the micro-switch when the cover is removed. The tamper evident seal may 
also be replaced with readily available crimping tools and seal components, leaving 
little physical evidence for forensic examination. 
 
By exploitation of the mechanical vulnerabilities described above, an attacker may 
access the link between the metrological and computational core of the meter and the 
WAN modem. In addition, an attacker has unrestricted access to the optical port. These 
attack vectors, along with an outline of the physical architecture of the meter, are 
illustrated in Figure 5.1. 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Meter and attack vectors 
 
5.2.3 - Testing of optical interface 
 
In order to establish whether the optical port of the meter is enabled and, this being 
the case, establish the parameters of the communications protocol, communication 
was attempted with the optical port at each of the range of different data rates stated 
as supported by the manufacturer. At each data rate, a null message with the framing 
characters <STX> and <ETX> (<0x02> and <0x03>) but without any frame content, as 
defined by the manufacturer’s documentation, was transmitted to the optical port. At 
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the configured data rate, this should generate an acknowledgment of the form 
<STX><ACK><ETX> (<0x02><0x06><0x03>).  
 
The hardware used for this test was an x86-64 laptop computer running the 64-bit 
edition of Debian GNU/Linux and a USB terminated optical read head. This contains a 
USB to UART bridge and an infrared receiver/transmitter pair for bidirectional 
communication with the optical interface of a meter. 
 
Upon connection to the laptop computer, the USB to UART bridge within the read head 
is recognised as a serial device, and serial device reference to it is created in the /dev 
directory of the operating system. The device file was configured using the stty 
command. The command string used is shown below. 
 
stty 300 cs8 -cstopb -parenb -F /dev/ttyUSB0 
 
In this command, 300 specifies a rate of 300 b/s, cs8 specifies 8 data bits, -cstopb 
specifies 1 stop bit, -parenb specifies no parity check and the -F argument specifies 
the serial device to be configured. Using this initial configuration, data was redirected 
from the input data file, containing the raw hexadecimal message string, to the USB 
interface of the optical head using the echo utility. The Linux cat utility was used to 
monitor for a response from the serial device. 
 
It was found that at a data rate of 9600 b/s, an acknowledgment of the expected form 
was received. 
 
5.2.4 - Choice of attack methodologies 
 
Informed by the vulnerability analysis, the following attack strategies were chosen for 
analysis: 
 
• Eavesdropping of bi-directional data from the RS-232 link between the meter and the 
WAN modem, in order to extract security credentials and information which might 
be used to impersonate either the meter or the head-end of the meter operating 
company. 
  
• Establishment of a command line session with the optical port of the meter, using 
extracted security credentials, in a manner which permits unauthorised access to the 
internal system of the meter.  
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5.3 - Attack toolkit 
 
5.3.1 - Architecture 
 
The attack toolkit consists of hardware and software components which permit the 
exfiltration of data transferred between the meter and the WAN modem, and 
communication with the optical port of the meter. The logical architecture of the attack 
toolkit is illustrated in Figure 5.2.  
 
 
Figure 5.2: Attack toolkit architecture 
 
5.3.2 - Hardware 
 
For the purpose of eavesdropping on data exchanged between the meter and WAN 
modem, a dual RS-232/USB bridge was used. This supports two bidirectional RS-232 
interfaces and, hence, the input channel of each of the interfaces was used to capture 
data on both the transmit and receive lines of the RS-232 connection under 
examination. A USB terminated optical interface head was used for communication 
with the optical port of the meter. The serial devices of both the RS-232/USB bridge 
and the optical read head were configured with a baud rate of 9600, 8 data bits, no 
parity check and one stop bit. The attack toolkit hardware is illustrated in Figure 5.3. 
 
The tamper evident seal of the serviceable enclosure cover was cut in order to permit 
access, and the tamper detection micro-switch allowed to trigger upon removal of the 
cover. The link cable between the WAN modem and the meter was removed and 
replaced by the attack toolkit hardware. 
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Figure 5.3: Attack toolkit hardware 
 
5.3.3 - Base operating system and software 
 
The workstation used was an x86-64 laptop computer running the 64-bit edition of 
Debian GNU/Linux. The Linux kernel of this distribution natively supported the 
integrated USB/serial bridge devices used in the dual RS-232/USB bridge, and the 
optical FLAG head. In this way, each of the RS-232 data channels and the optical 
interface appeared as serial devices in /dev of the workstation’s filesystem. 
 
5.4 - Attack procedure 
 
5.4.1 - Attack 1 
 
The meter and modem were energised from a fully de-energised state, and allowed to 
run for a period of ten minutes. During this time, the data exchanged between the 
meter and modem was captured by establishing pipes within the Linux operating 
system of the workstation to redirect data from the each of the two serial devices, 
capturing data flowing from the modem to the meter, and vice versa, to files. During 
the energised period, a connection was established between the meter and the head-
end server of the meter operating company, herein referred to as the ‘operator’, 
indicated by the front panel interface of the meter. 
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The Linux hexdump utility was used to view the binary, captured data in order that it 
could be analysed. The utility represents each byte in the input as a two-digit, 
hexadecimal number. 
 
Immediately after energisation, commands from the Hayes AT Command Set, in a 
human-readable format, were used by the meter to initialise the modem, as per the 
meter manufacturer’s documentation. Two commands used by the meter to configure 
the modem with parameters specific to this application were as follows: 
 
AT+CGDCONT=1,”IP”,”## -- REDACTED -- ##” 
ATD*99***1# 
 
The first, AT+CGDCONT, is used to define a packet datagram protocol (PDP) context. 
This is a data structure which is used to specify configuration information about a 
GPRS session before it is initiated. In this case, the command defined the PDP variant 
to be used as IPv4, and the access point to connect to as the URL of the meter 
operator. The second, ATD, is used to initiate a GRPS session, in this case of type IP, 
and using PDP context 1, defined previously. Following the successful establishment of 
a GPRS session, data exchanged between the meter and operator passes transparently 
through the modem until the escape sequence +++ is transmitted by the meter, 
causing the modem to return to accepting Hayes AT commands from the meter. 
 
From the manufacturer’s documentation, it was known that the point-to-point protocol 
(PPP), a variant of high-level data link control (HDLC), was being used to encapsulate 
the data being exchanged between the meter and the operator. The Linux hexdump 
utility was used to view this binary data in order that it could be analysed. The utility 
represents each byte in the input as a two-digit, hexadecimal number. An example of 
the raw data, in this case the first PPP frame captured following transmission by the 
meter operator, and demarcated by 0x7e bytes, is shown in Figure 5.4. 
 
 
Figure 5.4: Raw PPP frame in hexadecimal 
 
A script was written in Python to remove the escape sequences employed by PPP. 
These appear as the byte 0x7d, followed by the result of a bitwise XOR operation on 
the original byte and 0x20. The original byte is recovered by repeating the XOR 
operation on the escaped byte and 0x20. The raw frame presented in Figure 5.4 is 
shown with the escape sequences removed in Figure 5.5. 
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Figure 5.5: PPP frame with escape sequences removed 
  
Since PPP is a variant of HDLC for communications between exactly two peers, and 
does not use frame numbering, the address and control fields are redundant and may 
be disregarded. For the purposes of further analysis, these fields, and the flag bytes 
indicating the start and end of a frame, are omitted. 
 
The first exchange of data between the operator and meter following the 
establishment of a GPRS connection was a negotiation of the parameters for further 
PPP communication. This was performed by means of the link control protocol (LCP), 
contained within PPP packets, as shown in Figure 5.6. The operator first transmitted a 
configuration request to the meter specifying a maximum frame size of 1500 bytes, 
the use of no escape characters, the use of protocol and address/control field 
compression, and the use of the password authentication protocol (PAP). The response 
of the meter was a rejection of this configuration, specifying the maximum frame size 
option as the reason for rejection. The operator then repeated the original request with 
the maximum frame size option omitted. This was accepted by the meter with an 
Acknowledge response. The meter subsequently transmitted a configuration request to 
the operator specifying the use of protocol and address/control field compression, and 
the escaping of <XON> and <XOFF> characters for the purpose of software flow control. 
This was accepted by the operator with an Acknowledge response. 
 
Following configuration of the PPP connection, the password authentication protocol 
was used to authenticate the meter to the operator. This is shown in Figure 5.7. The 
protocol requires the username and password credentials to be transmitted in plain 
text. In this instance, the name of the meter operator was used as both the username 
and password. The authentication was successful, with the operator returning an 
Acknowledge response and the message ‘Welcome!’. 
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Figure 5.6: LCP negotiation
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Figure 5.7: PAP authentication and IPCP configuration (continued in Figure 5.8) 
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Figure 5.8: IPCP configuration (continued from Figure 5.7) 
 
Following successful authentication, the internet protocol control protocol (IPCP) was 
used to negotiate the assignment of IP addresses to both the operator and meter in 
order that IP communications could be used for further data exchange. This is shown 
in Figure 5.7. The operator first transmitted a request to the meter to use the IP 
address 192.168.111.111, which was accepted by the meter with an Acknowledge 
response. The meter then requested the assignment of an address by the operator. 
This was done by requesting the invalid IP address 0.0.0.0, which caused the operator 
to respond with a Negative Acknowledge, and a suggested IP address of 10.6.93.123 
for the meter. The meter then issued another request, this time using the suggested 
address. This was accepted by the operator with an Acknowledge response, as shown 
in Figure 5.8. Following configuration of the IP parameters using IPCP, data was 
exchanged between the operator and meter using encapsulated within UDP packets, 
which are in turn encapsulated by PPP. An example of the encapsulation, in this case 
the first UDP packet captured following transmission by the meter operator, is shown 
in Figure 5.9. 
 
 
Figure 5.9: UDP frame 
 
The UDP header information includes the source address, which may not be the 
originating device as a result of network address translation (NAT), the destination 
address, and the source and destination ports. For the purposes of further analysis, 
the UDP header information is omitted. 
 
A proprietary protocol for connecting to the meter for the purpose of command line 
communication is described by the meter manufacturer. The first attempt by the 
operator to logon to the meter in this manner is shown in Figure 5.10. 
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Figure 5.10: Logon attempts to meter by the operator 
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As defined by the manufacturer’s command line protocol, command line exchanges 
are grouped by means of a sequence number between 0 and 15 conveyed by the 
second four bits of the sequence number byte, of which the first four bits are always 
‘1’.  Secure logon to the meter comprises the transmission of a ‘K’ character, or the 
byte 0x4b, followed by an eight-byte encrypted password, and finally the username in 
plain text. In the first transmission by the operator in Figure 5.10, the username is 
seen to be ‘ADMIN’. However, the logon attempt was unsuccessful, with the meter 
returning a time and serial number, as per the manufacturer’s specification. The last 
four bytes of the returned string are equal to the serial number of the meter, 
211 070 059, expressed as a 32-bit unsigned integer in little endian format. The 
preceding four bytes are the current time and date, in the same binary format, 
expressed as the number of seconds since the start of the year 1996. In this first case, 
the time retuned is equal to 515 501 423 in denary, or a date and time of 10:50:25 on 
2nd May 2012. It is noted that the subsequent two logon attempts made by the operator 
to the meter were also unsuccessful, with the time field of the meter responses 
incrementing by one after each attempt. The fourth attempt by the operator to logon 
to the meter was successful, with the response of the meter an Acknowledge byte. 
 
Although the encryption scheme used by the manufacturer to protect the password is 
not described in the documentation found, it was inferred that it uses the time as an 
element in the encryption. The implication of this is that a given password will be valid 
only during the second in which it is generated. On this basis, multiple attempts may 
be required before synchronisation of the times used by both meter and operator to 
generate the password with sufficient accuracy is achieved, and the latency of the 
complete transmission path between the two peers is sufficiently low for the password 
to still be valid on arrival. 
 
Following the successful logon attempt, the operator requested the values of two 
registers, which were returned by the meter, as shown in Figure 5.11. Subsequent 
exchanges were not analysed until the operator requested a logoff from the meter with 
the transmission of an ‘X’ character, to which the meter responded with an 
Acknowledge byte. 
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Figure 5.11: Logon and data access of meter by the operator 
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As a result of the eavesdropping of communication between the meter and modem, 
and meter and meter operator, the following information was extracted: 
 
• GPRS configuration including operator access point name. 
 
• LCP configuration. 
 
• PAP username and password. 
 
• IPCP configuration, including IP addresses and ports used. 
 
• Username for command line logon to the meter. 
 
• Nature of encrypted password as time-dependent. 
 
5.4.2 - Attack 2 
 
In Section 5.2.3, the optical port of the meter was found to be enabled for command 
line communications, and is specified in the manufacturer’s documentation as 
supporting the same command line instruction set as is used for communication with 
the meter operator, via the WAN modem. Therefore, it was hypothesised that a replay 
attack could be effected against the meter, whereby an encrypted password used by 
the operator to login to the meter via the WAN modem might be used again to log in to 
the meter through the optical interface. In this way, decryption of the password would 
not be necessary for the attack. Furthermore, the username was already known due to 
being transmitted in plain text. Since the password was determined to be time-
dependent, and subject to change every second, manual analysis of the data stream to 
extract the password was not possible whilst retaining the required ‘freshness’ of the 
password. Accordingly, a Python script was written to extract the password from a 
captured secure logon attempt to the meter by the operator. The Python script first 
removes the escape sequences employed by PPP from each raw frame, an example of 
which is shown in Figure 5.12, and recovers the original bytes. 
 
 
Figure 5.12: Raw PPP frame 
 
The script then strips away the encapsulation of PPP and the successive protocol layers 
within: IPv4 and UDP, as shown in Figure 5.13. 
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Figure 5.13: Escaped PPP frame 
 
The command line string contained within the frame is then analysed. In the case of 
this example, the string was found to contain a secure logon attempt. The credentials 
from this are shown in Figure 5.14. 
 
 
Figure 5.14: Credentials from data field of UDP packet 
 
The framing required for communication with the optical interface of the meter is then 
added to the secure logon string consisting of a ‘K’ character, or the byte 0x4b, 
followed by the encrypted password and username. The <STX> flag is appended to the 
start of the string, and a null termination character to the end. Next, the XMODEM 
variant of the CRC16-CCITT XMODEM checksum of the frame is calculated, and 
appended to the end of the frame. Finally, the <ETX> frame terminating flag is 
appended to the end of the frame, as shown in Figure 5.15. 
 
 
Figure 5.15: Constructed frame for optical port 
 
The meter and modem were energised from a fully de-energised state. During the 
energised period, the meter and the head-end server of the metering provider 
established a connection, indicated by the front panel interface of the meter. Upon 
reception of the secure logon attempt by the meter from the operator, the Python 
script successfully parsed the frame, extracted the credentials, formed a frame of the 
type required for communication with the optical port, and transmitted it to this port 
via the optical head of the attack toolkit. The meter returned an Acknowledge byte via 
the optical port, indicating that the connection attempt was successful. 
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5.5 - Attack results analysis 
 
5.5.1 - Introduction 
 
The results of the attacks described in Section 5.4 are considered in the context of the 
CIA triad model of information security, as defined in ISO/IEC 27002:2013 [229], 
namely: 
 
• Confidentiality: Ensuring that information is accessible only to those authorised to 
have access. 
 
• Integrity: Safeguarding the accuracy and completeness of information and 
processing methods. 
 
• Availability: Ensuring that authorised users have access to information and 
associated assets when required. 
 
These tenets are widely employed in the field of information security, and are 
considered a simple test of security performance, whereby if any of the three are not 
fulfilled then the security of the system under test may be considered compromised. 
 
5.5.2 - Attack 1 
 
The data exchanged between the meter and the WAN modem comprises both the 
readings acquired by the meter in the course of monitoring a customer’s supply, and 
the operational data exchanged for purposes including mutual authentication, 
configuration, and management of the meter by the meter operator. Since the attack 
required physical proximity to the meter, it would likely not be effected without the 
complicity of the customer. Accordingly, the exfiltration of user data, such as energy 
consumption in a given time period, by means of the attack, is not a primary 
confidentiality concern. Rather, the issue of confidentiality in this case concerns the 
operational data exchanged between the meter and the WAN modem, in particular the 
configuration data and authentication credentials. The data used at all stages of the 
configuration of the WAN modem by the meter, and the connection and authentication 
to the operator by the meter, via the modem, was exchanged in plain text. As such all 
the information which would be required to impersonate the meter from the 
perspective of the operator, at the stages of authentication and configuration 
examined, was obtained. Such an attack would permit energy consumption to be 
inaccurately reported, or falsely attributed, for the purpose of energy theft. In the case 
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that measurements from smart meters are used to inform distribution network control 
decisions, such impersonation would also permit false data injection, which may lead 
to necessary network control action not being taken, or unnecessary control action 
being taken.  Furthermore, an agent impersonating a meter would be able to establish 
a connection to the operator through which an attack on the operator’s systems might 
be effected. 
 
Since the RS-232 link between the meter and WAN modem was eavesdropped rather 
than redirected, neither the integrity nor the availability of the data conveyed across it 
were compromised. However, since the data exfiltrated was sufficient to fully 
impersonate the meter at the stages of authentication and configuration examined, a 
further attack whereby the meter was impersonated would negate any assurance of 
data integrity or availability.  
 
5.5.3 - Attack 2 
 
As in the case of Attack 1, in which the confidentiality of data exchanged between the 
meter and the WAN modem was compromised, an authenticated terminal connection 
to the meter permits access to the registers within the device used to store customer 
energy consumption information. However, as in the case of Attack 1, this attack is 
unlikely to be effected without the complicity of the consumer. Rather, in addition to 
directly modifying the records of energy consumption for the purpose of inaccurately 
reporting, or falsely attributing energy consumption, access to the internal registers of 
the meter might allow a malicious agent to falsify readings by modifying the variables 
on which the calculated demand depends. For example, modification of the stored 
value of a current transformer ratio might allow a reduction in metered current, and 
hence billed consumption, to be effected. Whilst, under such circumstances, 
compromise of the availability of data to the meter operator does not yield an 
immediate benefit, compromise of the integrity of data supplied to the operator for the 
purpose of billing constitutes a clear motive for an attack. 
 
More critically, the attack exposes data specific to the meter operator, which is stored 
in the meter, to compromise. This might include encryption keys or authentication 
credentials used for access to, and control of, the meter by the operator, and may 
expose multiple meters to attack if common keys or authentication credentials are 
used. Compromise of multiple meters in this way would negate any assurance of data 
integrity or availability, and constitutes a critical vulnerability in the case that 
measurements from smart meters are used to inform distribution network control 
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decisions, or if such meters incorporate a remote supply disconnection facility, with 
the associated threat of malicious denial of energy 
 
5.6 - Recommendations 
 
The attacks described in Section 5.4 required some physical intrusion into the 
enclosure of the meter, albeit only into the serviceable, terminal section. This included 
breaking the tamper evident seal, although this is easily restored. It would be 
necessary to circumvent the tamper detection micro-switch, if it was required that no 
evidence of the attack was to be recorded by the meter. The attacks also required 
disconnection of the lead connecting the WAN modem, contained within the 
serviceable section, to the meter, in order that the attack hardware could be connected 
in its place. No mechanism exists in the meter examined to detect such infiltration. 
However, the addition of presence detection signal lines on the interface would 
significantly inhibit such an attack by detecting if the electrical link between WAN 
modem and meter was lost. Indeed, presence detection signals are included in the UK 
Data Communications Company Intimate Communications Hub Interface Specification 
[230], for the purpose of mutual detection of the presence of a smart electricity meter 
and communications hub, responsible for WAN communications. 
 
Of the data exfiltrated in the eavesdropping attack described in Section 5.4.1, the 
security credentials exchanged as plain text using the password authentication 
protocol (PAP) are the most significant. The use of the meter operating company’s own 
name as both username and password for the process is poor security practice. 
Furthermore, the credentials could be protected by employing the, alternative, 
challenge handshake authentication protocol (CHAP). Under this protocol, the peer 
wishing to perform authentication, in this case the meter operator, transmits a 
randomly generated ‘challenge’ string to the peer to be authenticated, in this case the 
meter. The peer to be authenticated combines the ‘challenge’ string with a pre-shared 
secret using a one-way hashing function, such as the secure hash algorithm (SHA), and 
returns the result to the authenticating peer. The authenticating peer compares the 
returned result with its own calculation of the hashing function and, if they match, 
acknowledges the authentication. Since each result is valid only for one authentication 
attempt, the process is immune to replay attacks. The challenge authentication 
protocol provides further security by periodically reissuing the authentication challenge 
in order that the link is maintained. The protocol is, however, still vulnerable to man-
in-the-middle attacks. 
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The replay attack described in Section 5.4.2 could be prevented by prohibiting a secure 
connection from being established on one interface using the same credentials 
previously used on another interface, or by preventing a secure connection from being 
established on one interface within one second of one being established on another. 
This would ensure that an encrypted password captured during the establishment of a 
secure connection on one interface would have expired before a secure connection 
could be established on another interface, and hence could not be reused. 
 
In addition to security compromises made with the level of physical access to the 
meter assumed for the attacks demonstrated in Section 5.4, known vulnerabilities of 
second-generation (2G) cellular technology security, such as the demonstrated 
weakness of the A5/1 stream cipher, evidence the value of effective end-to-end 
security between meters of this type and meter operators. Such security should include 
both reliable authentication and encryption. A solution which would enable the existing 
command line protocol employed between the meter and operator to be used, 
following establishment of a secure link, is mutually authenticated transport layer 
security (TLS). Under such a scheme, both the meter and operator possess certificates 
which enable them to prove their identity during the establishment of a secure link. 
The validity of the certificates is verified by means of a trusted, third party certificate 
authority. In practice, the third-party certificate authority may be used to verify the 
identity of a server which is a local peer of that which the operator wishes to be linked 
to a given meter. In this way, the third-party certificate authority generates an 
intermediate certificate which is used to verify the identity of the local peer, and this 
local server then acts the certificate authority for the purpose of establishing a secure 
link. An illustration of the establishment process for a TLS link is shown in Figure 5.16. 
 
Upon receipt of a request from a meter to establish a TLS connection, the meter 
operator presents its digital certificate, along with the public key of an asymmetric key 
pair, generated for the session, to the meter. The meter verifies the validity of the 
operator’s certificate and, finding it to be valid, presents its own digital certificate to 
the operator, along with a secret, symmetric encryption key, generated for the session, 
and encrypted with the public key supplied by the operator. The operator verifies the 
validity of the meter’s certificate and, finding it to be valid, decrypts the secret, 
symmetric key supplied by the meter, using the private key of the asymmetric key pair 
which it generated earlier in the link establishment process. 
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Figure 5.16: TLS link establishment process 
 
The current UK Smart Metering Equipment Technical Specifications (Version 1.58) [34] 
specifies that smart electricity meters should be capable of supporting the following 
cryptographic algorithms: 
 
• Elliptic Curve DSA 
 
• Elliptic Curve DH 
 
• SHA-256 
 
Furthermore, the document specifies that the electricity meter ‘shall be capable of 
generating Public-Private Key Pairs to support the Cryptographic Algorithms’ and ‘shall 
be capable of securely storing Security Credentials from Certificates including for use 
in the Cryptographic Algorithms’. A meter conforming to the current UK Smart 
Metering Equipment Technical Specifications would, therefore, be capable of 
supporting the security recommendations made in this section. 
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5.7 - Conclusion 
 
A smart electricity meter widely deployed in the UK as part of the smart meter roll-out 
programme has been analysed for potential vulnerabilities, and two attack 
methodologies chosen. Hardware and software tools have been developed in order to 
effect these attacks, and the results analysed in order to determine the degree to 
which the security of the smart meter has been compromised, and the potential 
consequences of this compromise. 
 
The first of these attacks demonstrated the acquisition of all the information required 
to impersonate the meter from the perspective of the operator. With this information, 
it would be possible to pose as a different customer in order to falsely attribute energy 
consumption, or to inaccurately report energy consumption, for the purpose of energy 
theft. If measurements from the meters of this operator were used to inform network 
control decisions, impersonation of this or other meters would allow false data to be 
injected, disrupting network control and potentially resulting in denial of energy if this 
disruption led to a loss of supply. Furthermore, the ability to establish a connection 
with the head-end system of the operator, posing as a trusted entity, exposes the 
operator’s systems to the threat of further penetration and compromise.  
 
The second of these attacks demonstrated local logon to the meter, posing as the 
operator, using intercepted and processed credentials. Connection in this way exposes 
data stored within the meter which is not intended to be accessed or modified by those 
other than the meter operator. In addition to the modification of the latest energy 
consumption data, for the purpose of inaccurate reporting and energy theft, it might 
also permit permanent modification of firmware registers used to derive consumption 
figures, in order to inaccurately report energy consumption in the future. A critical 
further concern is the exposure of encryption keys or authentication credentials which, 
if common to other meters of this operator, may allow access to those devices, posing 
as the operator. In this way, a widespread denial-of-energy attack may be effected in 
which supply disconnection of a large number of meters, by means of their remote 
disconnection facility, is directed by a malicious agent. It might also be possible to 
effect the widespread disruption of supply, by cyclically operating the remote 
disconnection device of a large number of meters in order to generate rapidly 
fluctuating load conditions on the distribution network. 
 
Finally, recommendations have been made as to how the security of such a meter 
might be improved, including by the employment of established protocols which would 
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satisfy both the requirement for robust and secure mutual authentication of a smart 
meter and operator, and for encrypted communication between them. 
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6 - Conclusions and further work 
 
6.1 - Conclusions 
 
The research objectives presented in Section 1.2.1 have been fulfilled. Conclusions of 
the research conducted on the subjects of distribution network control, and smart 
meter and AMI security, as well as further research contributions and pertinent, future 
research avenues, are presented in the following sections. 
 
6.1.1 - Distribution network control 
 
Climate change and the unsustainable consumption of fossil fuels have seen a global 
policy shift towards low-carbon technologies. However, the adoption of high levels of 
renewable generation represents a significant change in the requirements for power 
distribution. In contrast to the historical approach of centralised generation, 
distributed renewable generation, in particular, necessitates considerably more 
advanced distribution network control. This is exacerbated by the additional demands 
of other low-carbon technologies, for example electrified transport. Smart metering on 
low voltage networks offers the facility for monitoring the very periphery of the 
distribution network. This visibility supports an advanced level of control, which in turn 
increases the penetration of renewable generation which may be accommodated. 
 
In this work, a low voltage distribution network hosting a high penetration of solar PV 
generation, and electric vehicle charging, was considered. The distribution transformer 
supplying the network was equipped with an OLTC. This network was simulated on an 
RTDS, with the facility to provide real-time measurements of the voltage at critical 
points within the network as analogue output signals, and to receive SCADA 
commands to control the OLTC as input signals. A hardware smart meter test bed 
platform was developed, capable of acquiring electrical measurements and 
communicating these over a WAN in real-time. Four of these devices were used to 
monitor critical points in the simulated distribution network, by means of the analogue 
output signals of the RTDS. The hardware and software infrastructure required for WAN 
communication with multiple smart meters, and for SCADA communication, was also 
implemented. 
 
A controller was developed to direct the operation of the OLTC, via SCADA, informed 
by measurements from the smart meters. This was based on a simple voting 
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algorithm, under which action was taken in response to a voltage measurement taken 
by one or more of the smart meters which violated preset limits, if doing so was not 
expected to cause a new voltage limit violation elsewhere in the network, or to 
exacerbate one which already existed. The operation of the controller was 
demonstrated in scenarios of high solar PV generation, high EV charging demand, 
imbalance resulting from uneven distribution of generation and demand across 
phases, and conflicting generation and demand conditions in adjacent feeders. In the 
cases of high generation, high demand, and imbalance, the controller was shown to 
respond to voltage limit violations by directing OLTC operation in order to rapidly 
restore the voltage at all monitored points to within limits, and without causing further 
voltage limit violations. In the case of the conflicting generation and demand 
conditions, the controller was shown to determine that any OLTC operation would 
result in further voltage limit violations, and so no further action was taken. 
 
Existing work has shown that conventional AVC schemes may be effective in the 
presence of a limited penetration of DG power injection and EV charging demand. 
However, control in the presence of a high penetration of DG and EV charging requires 
visibility of LV networks beyond the secondary substation. Such visibility is made 
possible with the deployment of smart meters, but the response speed and flexibility 
of commercial meters for network monitoring, as a role secondary to their primary 
function of energy consumption reporting, has limited their use in published schemes. 
With the development of custom smart meter test beds, as part of a wider closed-loop 
smart meter test rig, this work has addressed this limitation. The rig further addresses 
the issue of placement of voltage monitoring in real-world trials, by permitting the 
smart meters to be deployed on a real-time distribution network simulation, in the 
locations most useful for a particular scenario. The evaluation of the automatic voltage 
controller developed in this work, accounting for the real-world communications and 
processing delays inherent in a real-world system, is therefore a valuable contribution 
to understanding in the field. The necessary simplification of the simulated distribution 
network and limited number of meters have been recognised as potential limitations of 
the system demonstrated. However, the fidelity of the power system simulated, and 
the number of smart meter test beds, have been sufficient for the purposes of the 
study undertaken. 
 
With the widespread deployment of AMI, and the evolution of OLTC-equipped 
distribution transformers, including those employing solid-state commutation or power 
electronic conversion, the test rig and voltage controller developed in this work 
represents valuable tools in the development of distribution network control to 
accommodate high penetrations of low-carbon technologies. 
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6.1.2 - Smart meter and AMI security 
 
The adoption of AMI inevitably incurs cyber security vulnerabilities which did not exist 
in the case of meters with no facility for remote communication. The magnitude of the 
threat which these constitute is significantly increased by the inclusion of a remote 
supply disconnection facility within smart meters. Although authoritative guidance is 
available on the issue of AMI security, this is not necessarily heeded by manufacturers. 
Approval schemes, such as the National Cyber Security Centre’s (NCSC) CPA scheme, 
seek to address this. However, vulnerabilities have been demonstrated in existing AMI 
deployments, and the communication technologies typically used in them. 
 
In this work, a cyber security vulnerability of a commercially deployed smart meter was 
examined. A hardware tool was constructed to permit the capture of data exchanged 
between the processor of the smart meter, and the modem used for WAN 
communication. The smart meter was configured in a standard form for domestic and 
light commercial metering, and data was captured in the course of communication 
between the smart meter and the head-end of the meter operator for the principal 
purpose of energy consumption recording. 
 
The data captured was analysed, and the frames of common communication protocols 
were extracted. It was established that a weak system for authentication of the smart 
meter to the head-end of the operator was employed. As such, the authentication 
credentials were extracted. Data made publicly available by the manufacturer of the 
smart meter on the Internet provided information on the format of the credentials used 
for authentication of the head-end operator to the smart meter, as well as 
authentication in the case of communication with the local, optical port of the smart 
meter. 
 
By intercepting data including credentials during the connection and authentication 
phases between the smart meter and the head-end of the operator, all the information 
required to impersonate a smart meter from the perspective of the meter operator was 
acquired. This would permit energy theft by impersonation of another meter, and the 
false reporting or attribution of consumption data. It might also permit disruption of 
network control by false data injection, or more extensive penetration of the head-end 
system of the operator by posing as a trusted entity. 
 
A software tool was developed which extracted the credentials used for authentication 
of the head-end operator to the smart meter, conveyed over the WAN interface, 
reformatted these credentials according to the protocol used for communication with 
6 - Conclusions and further work 
160 
the local, optical port of the smart meter, and issued them to this interface by means 
of an optical probe. It was demonstrated that, by means of this technique, local access 
was gained to the internal system of the smart meter, using the credentials of the 
meter operating company. This access exposes the possibility for the compromise of 
registers within the meter used in the process of consumption recording and 
reporting, for the purpose of energy theft, or encryption keys and authentication 
credentials which facilitate access to other smart meters and wider smart metering 
infrastructure. 
 
Recommendations have been made in order to address the vulnerabilities of a specific 
smart meter exposed in this work, addressing weaknesses in both the firmware and 
protocols employed by the device. However, the attacks described serve to 
demonstrate not only vulnerabilities within a specific AMI deployment, but also 
highlight the importance of applying the rigorous security practices employed in 
existing, security-critical infrastructure, such as that for smart payment cards, in AMI 
schemes. 
 
6.1.3 - Further achievements of research 
 
A demonstration rig illustrating smart meter control in response to real-time electricity 
pricing for the purpose of DSM, and based on four of the smart meter test beds, was 
presented to HRH The Princess Royal, and the former president of the Royal Academy 
of Engineering, Sir John Parker FREng, at the 2012 ‘Engineering a better society’ event 
of the Royal Academy of Engineering. The smart meter test beds and test rig used in 
this research were also presented to both UK and international academic partners, and 
to industrial parties, including manufacturers and DNOs. 
 
A period of secondment was taken with a commercial smart meter operator in the UK 
during the course of this research. At the time of this appointment, the operator was 
both installing smart meters and providing the head-end infrastructure to manage 
them. In addition to providing consultancy on cyber security provision, penetration 
testing of the infrastructure supplied by the operator was conducted. This formed the 
basis for Chapter 5 of this work. A report on cyber security considerations for smart 
meter design, including responses to the first iteration of DECC's UK Smart Metering 
Equipment Technical Specifications, was produced for DECC's Security Technical 
Experts working group. 
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6.2 - Further work 
 
Pertinent, future research avenues, further to this work, are presented in the following 
sections. 
 
6.2.1 - Distribution network control 
 
Mechanisms to effect voltage control may be examined to augment, or supplant 
control solely by means of an OLTC. Such mechanisms include DSM providing the 
facility for the control of demand, generation curtailment, reactive power flow control 
by PV inverters, and energy storage.  
 
Realistic time-series profiles may be applied to generation sources and loads in order 
to investigate the requirements for the frequency of control operations, as well as their 
response time in order to provide satisfactory voltage regulation. This might include 
changes to the granularity of power system simulation, with scope for both greater 
aggregation and more detailed representation in different areas of the simulated 
network as required. 
 
The implications for communication capacity and performance, particularly in the case 
of a high penetration of smart metering, may be examined. In particular, optimisation 
of the facility for network monitoring against the requirements of communications 
performance and cost may be considered, with the rig permitting assessment of the 
communications impact of congestion arising from a greater number of concurrent 
smart meter connections. 
 
Further, ancillary functions of smart metering, for example phase identification and 
outage management, including fault location, may be investigated. 
 
6.2.2 - Smart meter and AMI security 
 
The scope for the application of established security practice from related, security-
critical infrastructure, such as that for smart payment cards, to AMI schemes, may be 
examined. This pertains to hardware, firmware and software design, and to 
communication protocols. 
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The use of dedicated cryptographic hardware in smart meters, and the scope for 
adoption of design practices and techniques employed in such hardware, for example 
for the purpose of tamper detection and prevention, may be investigated. 
 
Analysis of the degree to which smart meters and smart metering infrastructure 
constitute an element of critical national infrastructure might be conducted. This is 
particularly critical if smart meters are equipped with a remote supply disconnection 
facility. 
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‘Strive for perfection in everything. Take the best that exists and make it better. If 
it doesn't exist, create it. Accept nothing nearly right or good enough.’ 
 
- Sir Frederick Henry Royce 
 
 
 
‘The only thing greater than the power of the mind is the courage of the heart.’ 
 
- John Forbes Nash Jr 
